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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recent revival of debate on statutory interpretation has
often been credited to the efforts of Justice Antonin Scalia.'
*Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
1. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 245 (1992) (classifying Justice Scalia as
person who "triggered the revival of interest in this subject"). But see Earl M. Maltz,
Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Over-
enforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 767, 767 (1991)
(identifying scholarship and crediting Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. with
revival).
In this article, the words "interpretation" and "construction" will be used in-
terchangeably. Some writers have made a distinction between the task of interpret-
ing versus construing statutes. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 19 (1975) ("The distinction between the cognitive and
the creative bears at least a superficial resemblance to that sometimes made,
though now generally disregarded, between 'interpretation' and 'construction.' ").
The distinction has also been made in the field of contracts. See Robert Childres,
Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 36 (1969) ("In interpreting
agreements, one is attempting to determine intention. In construing them, one is
(93)
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This movement repeats and continues the cyclical surge of theoreti-
cal response to the courts' handling of statutes that they are called
upon to interpret. Critical recognition has been given to an inter-
pretive methodology dubbed "New Textualism." 2 These scholars
contend that the current leading advocate, if not driving force be-
hind this movement, is Justice Scalia.3 The gist of textualist con-
struction is that judges should be controlled by text and stay away
attempting to prevent or to resolve controversies by asking how detached people
would handle them in light of good faith dealing according to reasonable stan-
dards."). Black's Law Dictionary also acknowledges a distinction but recognizes a
customary interchangeable use:
[i]n the strict usage of this term, "construction" is a term of wider scope
than "interpretation;" for, while the latter is concerned only with ascer-
taining the sense and meaning of the subject matter, the former may also
be directed to explaining the legal effects and consequences of the instru-
ment in question. Hence interpretation precedes construction, but stops
at the written text .... These two terms are however, commonly used
interchangeably.
See BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 817-18 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621
(1990) (examining new textualism critically and historically); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 827 (1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New
Legal Process, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1597, 1599 (1991) (explaining textualism "largely
as a reaction against the legal process theory set forth by Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: To-
ward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990) (criti-
quing textualism as theory of statutory interpretation).
3. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 640-56 ("Justice Scalia has aggressively criti-
cized the traditional approach and has argued for disregard of legislative history in
the great majority of cases .... Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook have essen-
tially founded a new school of thought about legislative history."); see also Daniel J.
Capra, Discretion Must Be Controlled, Judicial Authority Circumscribed, Federalism Pre-
served, Plain Meaning Enforced, and Everything Must Be Simplified: Recent Supreme Court
Contributions to Federal Civil Practice, 50 Mn. L. REv. 632, 633 (1991) (crediting Jus-
tice Scalia with "the most influential and powerful opinions" and "head-on style of
jurisprudence" that will continue to be effective and influential); Mashaw, supra
note 2, at 835 ("Indeed, one finds Justice Scalia, both the high priest of the new
textualism and a traditional conservative."); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper:
The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. Rv. 277, 281 (1990) (characterizing Justice Scalia
as movement's "spiritual" leader).
OtherJustices on the Supreme Court have subscribed to textualism from time
to time and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook's writings also figure prominently in
scholarship on this subject. Judge Easterbrook, like Justice Scalia, usually criticizes
the value of legislative history. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the
Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 87 (1984) (discussing problems of
statutory interpretation in light of legislative process); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat-
utes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 539 (1983) ("To delve into the.., legislative
history... is to engage in a sort of creation. It is to fill in blanks. And without
some warrant.., for a court to fill it in, the court has no authority to decide in
favor of the party invoking the blank-containing statute."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59
(1988) (criticizing judges' use of legislative history for statutory interpretation).
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from legislative history at all costs. Only in narrowly-defined situa-
tions should extratextual materials be considered and relied on.4
Even then, such materials should be put to limited use. This new
textualism also calls for more attention to the structure of statutes
(context), greater reliance on canons of construction, routine con-
sideration of other similar statutory schemes and increased use of
judges' grammatical skills with the aid of a dictionary. 5
Like other judges, Justice Scalia recognizes that the toughest
part of his job is avoiding personal political values in the decision-
making process. 6 Moreover, he contends that a text-focused ap-
proach reduces the potential for arbitrariness and abuse through
judicial improvisation and the substitution of personal value judg-
ments for that of Congress.7 Besides the need for a "textual
anchor," Justice Scalia argues that theoretical legitimacy must be
taken as seriously8 as consistency and logic to serve as necessary
checks on judicial arbitrariness. 9 He also grounds his method in
separation of powers principles. 10 At the same time, he recognizes
4. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 623-24 ("The new textualism posits that once
the Court has ascertained a statute's plain meaning, consideration of legislative
history becomes irrelevant. Legislative history should not even be consulted to
confirm the apparent meaning of a statutory text.").
5. Id.
6. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 863
(1989).
7. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670-71 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1175, 1185 (1989) (suggesting that judges need support from "solid textual
anchor" to avoid appearance of legislating).
8. Scalia, supra note 6, at 862.
9. Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 581, 588-89 (1989-90).
10. See Morrison Indep. Counsel v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Without a secure structure of separated powers, our Bill of Rights
would be worthless."); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983) (discussing doctrine of
standing as "crucial and inseparable" element of separation of powers principle).
Two dissenting opinions by Justice Scalia help illustrate the basis for his ap-
proach when reviewing actions by coordinate branch members. In Morrison In-
dependent Counsel v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), he concluded that conduct
classified as purely executive cannot be engaged in, controlled or affected by ac-
tions from the legislative or judicial branch. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-734 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
The Morrison case offers telling insights into justice Scalia's statutory construc-
tion jurisprudence. In a passionate and lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia reveals
strong separation of powers convictions that likely serve as the foundation and
pillars for the powers he regards as vested in a Justice of the Supreme Court. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Morrison decision suggests that these convictions partly
drive Justice Scalia's interpretive methodology more than a carefully crafted fresh
theoretic construct.
In Morrison, a statutory scheme was pivoted against the United States Constitu-
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tion. At issue was the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 49,
591-599 (1988), which has provisions for the appointment of independent coun-
sels, versus provisions in Articles II and III of the Constitution setting out separa-
tion of powers principles and providing the President with certain appointment
powers. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659-60 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appoint-
ments Clause); art. III).
In this case, three Department of Justice (DOJ) officials were accused of
wrongdoing by a House Judiciary Committee. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 666. One offi-
cial was accused of giving false and misleading testimony, while the other two were
alleged to have wrongfully withheld documents. Id. The Judiciary Committee
asked the Attorney General to seek the appointment of an independent counsel
under the Act. Id. The Special Division, a court created by the Act for this pur-
pose, appointed counsel. Id. at 667. Counsel was authorized to investigate and, if
necessary, prosecute the official providing perjured testimony. Id. Counsel was
also given authority to pursue "related matters." Id. Subsequently, Counsel asked
the Attorney General to refer the allegations against the other two officials as "re-
lated matters." Id. The Attorney General refused but the Special Division ruled
that its jurisdictional grant to Counsel was broad enough to encompass an investi-
gation of the other two officials. Id. at 667-68.
The officials then challenged the Act's independent counsel provisions, argu-
ing they were unconstitutional, and obtained an unfavorable district court ruling.
Id. at 668. That decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia which held that the Act was unconstitutional and violative
of the Appointments Clause. Id. at 669; see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding Act invalid for several reasons, including violation of
Appointments Clause and limitations of Article III). Seven Justices of the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669. Justice
Kennedy did not participate in the decision and Justice Scalia wrote an extensive
dissent. Id. at 697-734.
The Morrison case is somewhat different from other statutory interpretation
cases discussed herein because the constitutionality of the statute was at issue in
addition to interpretation concerns. In his dissent, Justice Scalia followed a plain-
meaning approach, with heavy emphasis on the words of the Constitution. Id. He
noted that Article I, § 1 of the United States Constitution vests all legislative powers
in Congress, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, vests all executive powers in the President, and
Article III, § 1 vests all judicial powers in the courts. Id. at 697-98. He then argued
that "all" means "all." Id. at 705. Therefore, once one concedes (as he found the
Court must) that the independent counsel is performing any executive function,
the conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds
is inevitable. Id.
Although standing on constitutional text, Justice Scalia placed heavy reliance
on the Founding Fathers, citing their statements as confirmation of the text. Id. at
697-734. Such deference to the Framers and use of their extratextual materials to
confirm constitutional language is curious in view of the politicized motivations
and actions of the Framers. As a consequence, this view of plenary powers for
officers of each branch of government offers some insight into Justice Scalia's in-
terpretive methodology and gives credence to the contention that textualism is
executive-enhancing. In Morrison, Justice Scalia argued that the executive, legisla-
tive and judiciary branches have complete and exclusive control of their respective
functions, inclusive of the power to police themselves. Id. at 708-10. He cites, for
example, an instance in which Congress passed a law exempting itself from certain
laws. Id. at 710. As a parallel example, he noted that the Court had ruled on the
constitutionality of a statute reducing the Justices' salaries. Id. (citing United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 211-17 (1980)). Justice Scalia recognizes the potential
for abuse of such a construct but feels that built-in checks will deter abuse. In any
event, he feels that any harm resulting is part of the cost of constitutional govern-
ment. Id.
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that there is no agreed-upon cure-all theory of statutory
construction.11
Justice Scalia's many critics contend that his interpretive meth-
odology is executive-enhancing by design. 12 Critics argue that tex-
tualism does not operate as a restraint on interpretive abuses but
has the contrary effect of giving the mostly Republican judiciary
In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), Justice Scalia argued that
Congress' work product is imprecise, and by implication, leaves a constitutionally
permissible role for executive and judicial officers to exercise judgment or even
make policy. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For Justice Scalia,
there is no question that executive and judicial officers can behave in this manner.
The only constitutional constraint is one of degree. Id. at 415-17. This paradigm
gives him total control when manning the walls around the executive and leaves
congressional enactments vulnerable to incursions by actors from the coordinate
branches.
Mistretta also offers glimpses of Justice Scalia's belief that Congress is imper-
fect and judges are intelligent. Of course, such an assessment serves as the perfect
springboard for a broad grant of judicial discretion and responsibility when inter-
preting the law. Further, it advances Justice Scalia's model of interpretation which
proceeds on the premise that judges should use their intellect and common sense,
accept the responsibility of interpreting the law and where appropriate, make pol-
icy choices.
Once cast in such principled light, Justice Scalia zealously undertakes his stat-
utory interpretation responsibilities which require that he dislodge himself from
the discussions and compromises attendant to legislation drafting or Congress' "in-
ternal work product." For him, this information is of limited probative value be-
cause only the enacted words are the law, much as a Court decision is the law
regardless of the competing views and opinions of the dissenting Justices whose
comments accompany the decision. Because Congress' work is the text of a statute
and judges have exclusive powers to interpret that text, judges must function as
independent interpreters, not as conduits for legislative proposals or court officers
working with a congressional handbook. Id. at 417. If judges consider the infor-
mation that members of Congress relied on, they begin to slip into the legislators'
territory, and therefore begin performing legislative functions. Justice Scalia real-
izes that he may sometimes give incorrect interpretations of statutes, but regards
Congress' freedom to amend as an inherent check. In any event, Congress' failure
to amend a statute to overrule an incorrect interpretation would be chalked up as
part of the costs of our democratic system of government.
11. Scalia, supra note 6, at 865.
12. See Wald, supra note 3, at 308 ("[lit should not pass unnoticed that the
textualist version of statutory interpretation is, in fact, executive-enhancing."); Ste-
phen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes To Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399 (arguing
that Justice Scalia's view of separation of powers systematically favors executive
branch over legislative branch); see also Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Inter-
pretation and DeferenceforJustice Scalia, 12 CARDozo L. Rv. 1663, 1680 (1991) (sug-
gesting that textualism shifts power away from legislative and judicial branches to
executive branch); Daniel N. Reisman, Deconstructing Justice Scalia's Separation of
Powers Jurisprudence: The Preeminent Executive, 53 ALB. L. REv. 49 (1988) (arguing
thatJustice Scalia's "vision of a powerful and largely unchecked executive power -
and not a neutral, textually based theory of separation of powers - is the transcen-
dent guiding principle of his jurisprudence"); Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's
Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses,
1990 DuE LJ. 160 (arguing that failure to consult legislative history redistributes
power from legislative branch to executive branch).
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free reign to advance their personal reading of texts.13 They add
that what the Republicans did not get from a Congress controlled
by Democrats, sympathetic judges provide through textualism that
avoids legislative history dominated by unfavorable language.1 4 As
a result, Democrats lose twice. First, the Democrats lose by compro-
mising their position to get bipartisan support for legislation,15 and
second, the Democrats lose through a narrow, politically-infected
interpretation that abandons traditional (established) rules of con-
struction that include consideration of legislative history.
16
However, Justice Scalia's method has its supporters.17 While it
is conceded that his judicial record is conservative, supporters ar-
gue that his adjudicative methodology surmounts political convic-
tions and charge his critics with superficial analysis.18  One
supporter traced Justice Scalia's interpretive methodology in consti-
tutional cases to his religious roots and concluded that text and
methodology control outcomes rather than political views or a de-
sire to make policy.19 Further, admirers.point to his "unrepresenta-
tive" (liberal) opinions as weighty proof that his interpretive
13. See Ross, supra note 12, at 401 ("By ignoring indicia of actual legislative
intent in favor of a meaning based on a judge's inevitably personal reading of the
words of a statute, the judiciary inevitably tilts the process of interpretation in favor
of its preferences and away from the legislature's."); Wald, supra note 3, at 304-05
("Several opinions this past Term that eschewed legislative history replaced it with
what sometimes looked like a free-form romp through the 'structure' of a statute,
or it's 'evident design and purpose.' The phrase[ ] 'Congress must have meant
this or that' . . . appear[s] without apparent source other than the writing judge's
mindset."); see also Muriel M. Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism As Power Strug-
gle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994) (arguing that textualism increases judicial power
at Congress' expense).
14. See Ross, supra note 12 (arguing that judges can use textualism to support
partisan interpretations). Now that Republicans control Congress, it would be
worthwhile to revisit this issue in the future to evaluate the Court's response to
Republican-initiated legislation.
15. Logically, this contention only has full force when the President is a
Republican.
16. "Traditional rules of construction" refers to the long-standing practice of
judges to start their interpretation with the statute's text and reserve wide latitude
to consider extratextual materials (primarily legislative history) in their search for
intent. See Maltz, supra note 1, at 769 (discussing traditionalist model of statutory
interpretation).
17. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
LJ. 1297 (1990) (examining theory, sources and results ofJustice Scalia's constitu-
tional methodology); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 621 (evaluating "New Textualism").
18. See Kannar, supra note 17, at 1299 (describing Justice Scalia as enigmatic
figure whose judicial opinions often contradict his political philosophy); Eskridge,
supra note 2, at 668-69 (finding that 'Justice Scalia sometimes deploys his method-
ology to endorse a liberal interpretation of a statute, over the objections of tradi-
tional conservatives").
19. Kannar, supra note 17, at 1310-20. But see Donald L. Beschle, Catechism or
Imagination: Is Justice Scalia's Judicial Style Typically Catholic?, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1329,
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method is not driven by value judgments.20
Commentators have been successful at labeling Justice Scalia's
work, detailing its frailties, proposing their own theories and above
all, provoking discussion on statutory interpretation. Once Justice
Scalia was dubbed a textualist, scholars neglected to check the evi-
dence upon which that conclusion is grounded. The fact is, how-
ever, that any evaluation of Justice Scalia's interpretive work must
be grounded in his judicial opinions. Too often, scholars rely on
Justice Scalia's reputation and therefore cite few of his opinions.
Some merely assume he is a textualist and thus avoid the task of
studying his judicial opinions. Others go so far as to rely on avail-
able non-opinion data that is scant and superficial. 21 Reflection
and reliance on educational, religious and social information, while
useful in some contexts and for some limited purposes, are unrelia-
ble decoders of adjudicative methodology. They are unreliable be-
cause of their incompleteness and also because of their highly
speculative nexus or relationship to the interpretive task. In fact,
grounding Justice Scalia's methods to such extra-judicial roots is
akin to substituting extra-textual data for text. The insistence on a
textualist label, therefore, appears to be most beneficial to scholars
because of its scholarship-enhancing capacity.
This article first studies Justice Scalia's statutory interpretation
decisions to determine whether a coherent theory of construction
can be identified. His opinions reveal consistent advocacy of a text-
based approach which logically could be called textualism. Cri-
tique of his approach is provided throughout. This section also
provides an example of Justice Scalia's deployment of the construc-
tion format he preaches. 22
1347 (1992) (questioning Professor Kannar's religious theory and noting its reli-
ance on anecdotal evidence).
20. Kannar, supra note 17, at 1299.
21. The available non-opinion data is typically short speeches on legal topics
more notable for legal semantics and levity than ascertaining the origin of Justice
Scalia's interpretive drives. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 10, at 881 (examining impor-
tance of judicial standing to principle of separation of powers); Antonin Scalia,
Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 123 (1986) (dis-
cussing interconnection between morality and distributive justice); Scalia, supra
note 6 (discussing frailties and defects of nonoriginalism versus those of original-
ism); Scalia, supra note 7, at 1175 (exploring dichotomy between "general rule of
law" and "personal discretion"); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511 (critiquingjustifications for judicial defer-
ence to administrative interpretations of legislation); Scalia, supra note 9, at 581
(discouraging use of" lego-babble" phrases such as: "[r] emedial statutes are to be
liberally construed").
22. For an example ofJustice Scalia's deployment of the construction format,
see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
1995]
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The second section of this article focuses on Justice Scalia's in-
fidelities to the brand of textualism he preaches in order to high-
light patent interpretive inconsistencies evidenced in his
decisions. 23 It will also explore in some detail the allegation that
Justice Scalia's textualism is nothing more than a front for conserva-
tive majoritarian thought. This will be done by dissecting Justice
Scalia's work on several controversial statutes and monitoring
whether he is following articulated rules consistently or deviating in
an unprincipled manner. This section shows selective and tortured
use of rules that clearly disassociates Justice Scalia from the theoret-
ical and practical foundations of textualism. At the same time, this
section consistently reveals conservative values as Justice Scalia at-
tempts, often successfully, to narrow or eliminate statutory protec-
tion for disadvantaged individuals.
The third section of this article discusses the value of theories
of construction and legislative history in the interpretive process.
2 4
It suggests that the theories spawned by "new textualism" will not
help because they are grounded in the false premise that judges
want a mechanism that creates lab conditions and produces correct
results. This section observes that theories and rules have not per-
fected the interpretive process because personal preferences,
whether driven by morality or reason, remain dominant. This is
compounded by the indeterminacy of human interpreters. Finally,
this section suggests that Congress may be the best check on judi-
cial abuse by illustrating how the unprincipled advocacy of a
Justice's ideological perspective can endanger thatJustice's "constit-
uents" by exposing them to more stringent responses from
Congress.
II. JUSTICE ScALIA's THEORY OF TEXTUALISM
As a general proposition, textualism is an attractive theoretic
construct that could potentially improve the quality of statutory in-
terpretation if for no other reason than because it gives judges a
determinate philosophy and framework of interpretation. 25 How-
ever, textualism, like other theories, is not an equation with finite
23. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's infidelities to his textualist approach,
see infra notes 73-171 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the value of theories of construction and legislative
history in the interpretive process, see infra notes 162-95 and accompanying text.
25. See DICKERSON, supra note 1, at 163 (noting that widespread use of legisla-
tive history by judges is partly attributable to "lack of a coherent philosophy of
judicial 'interpretation,' broad naivete about the general principles of communica-
tion, and a general ignorance of the realities of the legislative process").
[Vol. 40: p. 93
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variables that judges can mechanically apply to text.26 In practice,
it is a malleable theory subject to variation and manipulation and
can be applied with as much or as little consistency as a particular
judge chooses.27 This reality returns us to a doctrinal quandary be-
cause the theory can only be evaluated by looking at how individual
judges choose to apply it, not in its pure theoretical form. Add to
this the judge's changing identity triggered by subject matter, train-
ing, experience and the interpretive process, and an opinion may
seem irrational or arbitrary.
Justice Scalia vigorously advocates and sometimes practices textu-
alism.2 8 His admonition against the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes reverberates throughout his opinions.29 Schol-
26. See Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MiAmi
L. REv. 505, 508-09 (1987) (discussing and rejecting "idealist" image of judges as
robots applying legal rules to facts and partly crediting "skeptic's" view that judges
are political and insert their personal values when applying law).
27. RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1985)
(" [T] he irresponsible judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he
desires.").
28. See City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588, 1591-
94 (1994) (concluding that plain meaning of Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act does not exempt municipal waste combustion ash generated by petitioner);
West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best evidence of
that purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submit-
ted to the President. Where that contains a phrase that is unambiguous ... we do
not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legisla-
tors or committees." (citation omitted)); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S.
122, 135 (1989) (holding that Warsaw Convention's clear text does not eliminate
limitation on damages if air carrier fails to inform passengers in writing of limita-
tion); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 122 (1988) (concluding that
text of Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, in 30 U.S.C. § 902(f) (2) (1944),
could not support restrictive meaning embraced by Secretary of Labor); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573-74 (1988) (concluding that language and structure
of governing statute required awarding of attorneys' fees exceeding hourly cap);
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771-74 (1988) (using textual analysis to de-
termine whether Kungys' misrepresentations were "material" under governing stat-
ute); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)
("Statutory construction . . .is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme
- because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its
meaning clear."); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 493, 501 (1988) (using statutory
language and construction to conclude that certain employees under Civil Service
Reform Act were not entitled to judicial review); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368,
379-83 (1987) (applying textual analysis to conclude that personal injury awards
are "income," not "resources," under statute governing Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children program). In these opinions, Justice Scalia essentially maintains
advocacy of text-focused analysis that lends some credence to the claim that he is a
textualist. More importantly, these opinions reveal an inconsistent application,
and what at times appears to be manipulation of the textualist format to achieve
particular results. A juxtaposition of his interpretive format in Lukhard to that in
Pierce reveals flagrant contradictions developed later in this article.
29. Because the other Justices have not fully converted to Justice Scalia's
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ars have had no difficulty concluding that Justice Scalia is a textual-
ist, although they routinely go on to identify and critique the
ideological and practical weaknesses of his brand of textualism. 30
For example, although one commentator finds the constitutional
brand of textualism and still rely in many instances on legislative history, Justice
Scalia spends a great deal of time writing concurring opinions. Although he often
agrees with the result reached by the Court, he frequently disagrees with the
Court's use of legislative history as a means of reaching that result. See Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Court
should not have consulted legislative history once it concluded that statute was
unambiguous and unequivocal because "[that is not merely a waste of research
time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law"); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with holding
except to extent it relied on legislative history); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that statements of hand-
ful of legislators in Congress ought not determine meaning of statute's text);
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing
that preratification materials such as floor debates and committee reports are irrel-
evant when interpreting plain text of Convention); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489
U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (concurring in judgment except where
majority relies on court decisions cited in statute's legislative history); United
States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
consideration of legislative history is unnecessary when statute's text is susceptible
to independent construction by Court); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 640 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing Court's decision that purposes of statute can sur-
mount its text is error); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (suggesting that lengthy analysis of legislative history is unnecessary
when meaning can be determined from text and structure of statute).
Sometimes Justice Scalia's concurring opinions offer more categorical state-
ments on statutory construction. See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judgment) (arguing that if criminal stat-
ute is ambiguous, under rule of lenity, more lenient interpretation should be ap-
plied); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 840 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that unless text of statute clearly provides other-
wise, non-penal legislation can only be applied prospectively); NLRB v. United
Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (suggesting that when statute is silent or ambiguous, courts should defer to
agency's interpretation).
Other concurring opinions evidence disagreement with the Court's factual
conclusions or interpretive approach. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 318 (1988) (Scalia,J., concurring) (arguing that Court's plain meaning
construction and reliance on dictionary is contextually defective); Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
Court's broad definition of context in its attempt to ascertain intent); Citicorp
Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 40 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (offer-
ing broader interpretation of statute's text than Court); California Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagree-
ing with Court's contextual analysis of civil rights statutes).
30. For example, Professor Eskridge concluded that constitutional formalism
does not supportJustice Scalia's theory, nor has it been demonstrated that limited
judicial discretion is mandated by separation of powers principles. See Eskridge,
supra note 2, at 671-77. Further, Professor Eskridge argues that textualism does
not necessarily give Congress clear interpretive rules that can assist it in legislation
drafting. Moreover, Eskridge argues that this new theory has not proven to be a
total constraint on judges. Id.
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foundation for this "new" theoretic construct lacking or weak and
details some of its operational limitations, he nonetheless con-
cludes that Justice Scalia's brand of textualism "has already been a
valuable intellectual contribution to theoretical literature on statu-
tory interpretation."31
Stimulating theoretic literature may be a beneficial attribute of
Justice Scalia's textualism, particularly for legal academics. How-
ever, the real benefits or dangers of textualism lie with its custodian
or molder, the judge. Hence, focus on the expansion of theoretic
literature should be balanced with critical review of the theory's sus-
ceptibility to manipulation. Although Justice Scalia's views on statu-
tory construction are the subject of a growing body of literature,
there remains several critical concerns that have not been fully de-
veloped or discussed in legal scholarship.3 2 Even more, Justice
Scalia's decisions deserve a rigorous across-the-board scrutiny, in
view of the broad-based conclusions reached by scholars.
A. Plain Text
Justice Scalia believes that the text of a statute is its true body
or corpus. Legislation is the text of a treaty, statute, regulation or
rule. 33 It is the language approved in final form by Presidents, Con-
31. Id. at 666. Based on a study of Justice Scalia's opinions in the area of
statutory construction, a more accurate conclusion is that it is too early to tell
whether he is making any contribution, much less a valuable contribution, to this
area. Through a review of most of Justice Scalia's opinions on this subject, this
article will show many contradictions that likely defeat the conclusion that there is
widespread adherence to the textualist theory.
32. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3, at 298-99 (arguing that judges need context
when interpreting statutes and legislative history plays important role in statutory
interpretation). Judge Wald also suggested that Justice Scalia's approach may sim-
ply be a design to enhance the powers of the Republican qua conservative execu-
tive branch. Id. at 308; see also Ross, supra note 12, at 402 (suggesting that new
textualism is conservative ploy to enhance power and discretion ofjudiciary heavily
populated by Republican appointees and empowers agency heads promulgating
Republican-friendly regulations).
In response to the indictments handed down by Judge Wald and Professor
Ross, Professor Eskridge, for example, responded that their allegations do not "in-
terest" him. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 669. But not only are these allegations
interesting, but they have a basis in fact. In fact, although Professor Eskridge sug-
gested that his critique was grounded in different concerns from Judge Wald and
Professor Ross, his conclusions that textualist methodology can potentially undo
the work of Congress goes to the core of these commentators' critique. Id. at 673-
76.
33. See, e.g., RL.C., 503 U.S. at 309 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judg-
ment) ("The only thing that was authoritatively adopted for sure was the text of the
enactment; the rest is necessarily speculation."); Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined,
not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a
larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which mean-
1995]
11
Plass: The Illusion and Allure of Textualism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: p. 93
gresses and agencies. 34 Negotiations and legislative histories are
not law.35 As such, judges must enforce the text's literal language.
When the language is plain, it is unwise to consult legislative his-
tory, even if such consultation is to confirm the plain meaning of the
text.3 6 Justice Scalia has consistently been spilling ink to dissuade
his colleagues on the Court from consulting legislative history after
they concluded that a statute's text is clear. Because Justice Scalia
believes that the use of extratextual information to confirm plain
text is inappropriate, its use for any other purpose when the text is
plain is logically sacrilegious.3 7
ing is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to
have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the stat-
ute ... and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated .... I would not permit any of the historical and
legislative material discussed by the Court... to lead me to a result different from
the one that these factors suggest."); Stuart, 489 U.S. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Treaties are the subject of careful consideration before they are entered into,
and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt
words in which to embody the purposes of the high contracting parties. Had it
been the intention to commit the administration of estates of citizens of one coun-
try, dying in another, exclusively to the consul of the foreign nation, it would have
been very easy to have declared that purpose in unmistakable terms.") (quoting
Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912)); see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490
U.S. 122, 134 (1989) ("[W]here the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to
insert an amendment."); Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (ob-
jecting to Court's analysis of cases cited in Committee Report instead of focusing
on text of statute); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring) ([W]e should
not look to the legislative history at all. This text is eminently clear, and we should
leave it at that.").
34. See Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that terms of
statute are words entire Congress voted on); Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("Congress is elected to enact statutes rather than point to cases, and
its Members have better uses for their time than poring over District Court opin-
ions."); Stuart, 489 U.S. at 374-75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that treaty
embodies terms approved by signatories empowered to enter into such arrange-
ment and does not include preratification information that may have been under-
stood by only one party).
35. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345-46. Justice Scalia suggested in Stuart, however, that
extra textual materials such as negotiations history, that reflect mutual understand-
ing, may be consulted. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 374 (Scalia, J., concurring). The general
tenor of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Stuart indicates that such materials
would not be considered as an original matter, but rather, would be consulted
upon a finding of ambiguity. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring). If that is the case,
it represents a somewhat different textualist format for interpreting treaties than
for statutes.
36. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 373 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even, however, if one
generally regards the use of preratification extrinsic materials to confirm an unam-
biguous text as an innocuous practice, there is special reason to object to that
superfluous reference in the present case.").
37. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that if text is plain, Court can-
not confirm with preratification materials); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that if text is plain, Court should not
refer to legislative history); California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
12
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There is widespread agreement that the words which survive
the legislative process and obtain the President's approval consti-
tute the primary legal component of a statute. If those words are
plain, they should be given their effect. Justice Scalia recognizes
that legislation is the product of compromises which likely affect
the clarity of a statute's final language and accommodates compet-
ing interests.3s With social legislation, this reality is magnified. In
fact, when the legislation is controversial, language is sometimes
purposefully left ambiguous to facilitate passage of an Act in spite
of unresolved conflicts.3 9 Add to this any frailty in draftsmanship,
and the malleability and imperfections of English words, the likeli-
hood that one would find plain language diminishes dramatically.40
272, 295 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that if statute has specific lan-
guage on subject, Court should not consider general language).
38. SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1986) (Scalia,J.,
dissenting) ("To make matters worse, [the majority] assays the current Congress'
desires with respect to the particular provision in isolation, rather than (the way the
provision was originally enacted) as part of a total legislative package containing
many quids pro quo.").
39. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
To secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Act), Congress left at least two
key issues, affirmative action and retroactivity, unresolved. Id. Congress left af-
firmative action open-ended by providing that "[N]othing in the amendments
made by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative
action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the law." Id. § 116,
105 Stat. at 1079. With respect to retroactivity, the 1991 Act provides that
"[E]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made
by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." Id. § 402(a), 105 Stat. at 1099. How-
ever, the Act further provides that it will not apply retroactively in certain cases.
Section 402(b) of the statute provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a
complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was
rendered after October 30, 1983." Id. § 402(b), 105 Stat. at 1099. Further, § 109
which deals with the statute's extraterritorial application provides: "The amend-
ments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring
before the date of the enactment of this Act." Id. § 109(c), 105 Stat. at 1078. The
retroactivity issue was eventually settled when the Supreme Court rendered the
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), and Rivers v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994) decisions. In both decisions, the Court held that
the 1991 Act does not apply retroactively. Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1508 ("The pre-
sumption against statutory retroactivity is founded upon sound considerations of
general policy and practice, and accords with long held and widely shared expecta-
tions about the usual operation of legislation."); Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519 (holding
that Congress had no intent to reach pre-enactment conduct). In evaluating the
statute's text in Landgraf the Court concluded that Congress did not clearly pro-
vide when the Act applies and in all likelihood left this issue unresolved as part of
the legislative compromises that helped secure the Act's passage. Landgraf 114 S.
Ct. at 1494-96.
40. Compare Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968) (holding that judges must turn to extrinsic evidence to
discern plain meaning of contracts) with Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing use of extrinsic evidence, but arguing
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Justice Scalia typically concludes that language is plain and
amenable to literal enforcement. The foundation for this conclu-
sion is grounded in a broad definition of "plain" and his periodi-
cally declared confidence in the drafters.41 In instances when he
determines that the drafters were not effective, his intellectual skills
are brought to bear on the language.42 This sometimes allows him
to find the language "plain" or its meaning obvious even when the
statute does not specifically address the question before the
Court.43 By broadening the definition of "plain," Justice Scalia
avoids both textual and legislative context by giving priority to com-
mon sense, the dictionary or other statutes instead of working with
the statute's language, its purpose or reliable elements of legislative
history. As a result, common sense, literal meaning (which may not
be actual meaning because it is detached from context) and the
text of other statutes are deemed more reliable than the communi-
cative device chosen by the legislators.
Justice Scalia's broad definition of "plain" presents many
problems. In United States v. Taylor" and Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co.,45 broad grammatical definitions assigned to words al-
lowed Justice Scalia to use personal assumptions and speculation in
interpreting statutory language. Logically, as the definition of
"plain" gets broader, the likelihood of a conclusion of vagueness or
ambiguity diminishes. By foreclosing a conclusion of vagueness or
ambiguity, Justice Scalia rationalizes his reliance on interpretive de-
vices that may not have been considered or relied on in the legisla-
tive process. The danger of result-oriented analysis thus increases
markedly.
Justice Scalia argues that his plain text approach prevents
judges from substituting their personal value judgments for that of
Congress more effectively than reliance on legislative history. He
also argues that only by working primarily with the text can judges
that its use undermines basic principle of language as binding constraint on public
and private conduct); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Theodore M. Shaw, The
Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v.
Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687, 696 (1992)
(arguing that Justice Scalia's misapplication of plain meaning rule in Casey
stemmed from his failure to "understand the linguistic variations" of fee-shifting
statutes he considered).
41. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling Tide VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 "a model of statutory draftsmanship").
42. E.g. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (substituting his personal assumptions for vague text).
43. Id.
44. 487 U.S. 326 (1988).
45. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
[Vol. 40: p. 93
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respect separation of powers principles and avoid engaging in legis-
lative functions. Although respecting plain text is desirable or even
mandated, Justice Scalia's idea of "plain" makes his approach no
more reliable than one that relies on legislative acts which have lit-
tle or no probative value. His definition of "plain," which broadens
the text that survived the legislative process, belies any claim of re-
spect for deferring to legislative conclusions.
B. Plain Text but Absurd Result
An interesting methodology is proposed by Justice Scalia for
language plain on its face but produces absurd results when ap-
plied. In such cases, one might reflexively want to consider legisla-
tive history to determine what Congress desired or intended, in
order to breathe meaning into the language. This is not allowed
under Justice Scalia's approach. Under his methodology, you can
consult legislative history, but not for the purpose of finding out
what the language means. Legislative history may be consulted
solely to confirm that the language does not mean what it says.46
Once such confirmation is obtained, the judge's grammatical skills
take over with guidance from a dictionary.47 This allows Justice
Scalia to use his personal views to contextualize the statute rather
than seek context from enactment data such as purpose clauses,
drafting changes or committee reports.
C. Ambiguous Text
When confronted with ambiguous text, Justice Scalia approves
consultation of extratextual materials.48 But that does not mean
that one should instantly resort to legislative history. It means ana-
46. Id. at 527-30 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Court wrongfully con-
sulted Committee and Conference Reports and floor debates to determine what
text meant, instead of using such materials to confirm that word "defendant" in
text could not have been meant literally).
47. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 128 (1989) (analyzing
language of Warsaw Convention); Pittson Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113
(1988) (using dictionary and analysis of section's sentence structure to interpret
statute); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (analyzing connotations
of word "substantial"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 284-89 (1988)
(analyzing regulation's words and phrases within their context).
48. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563-68 (looking first at House Committee report to in-
terpret phrase but then rejecting report because it is not authoritative interpreta-
tion); K Mart, 486 U.S. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that one need only determine whether Customs Service's interpretation
of statute is reasonable); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that it would have been sufficient for Court to look to
legislative history only to determine if there was "clearly expressed legislative
intent").
1995]
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lyzing the structure of the statute, using canons of construction and
considering similar schemes to reconcile the ambiguity. 49 If two
plausible meanings evolve, other similar schemes can help to iden-
tify the most accepted view.50 Resort to legislative history is only
appropriate if a clear congressional command can be found in pre-
enactment data.5'
In principle, Justice Scalia's formulation on ambiguity appears
attractive. Statutory structure, canons and similar statutory schemes
may assist in providing context in the search for meaning. How-
ever, the potential for manipulation is ever-present. For example,
after Justice Scalia consults these textual and non-textual sources,
he may still choose a meaning that the average or intended reader
would reject. Such occurrences suggest thatJustice Scalia may have
been searching less for meaning than a means of manipulating
meaning.
D. Justice Scalia's Textualism Deployed
In Pierce v. Underwood,52 Justice Scalia used typical textualist
doctrine. A provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) 53
was before the Court which stated that prevailing parties may re-
cover attorney's fees from the United States unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was "substantially justified."54
At issue was whether the lower court's finding that the govern-
ment's position was not substantially justified, constituted an abuse
of discretion.55
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the test to determine the meaning of "substantially justi-
fied" was whether the government "had a reasonable basis both in
law and in fact" for its decision.56 This meaning was adopted al-
49. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 552; K Mar, 486 U.S. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452.
50. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565. In PiercA Justice Scalia sought guidance in inter-
preting the Equal Access to justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988), from the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1988), and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 37(a) (4), (b) (2) (E), because of their "substantial evidence," and
"substantially justified" standard, respectively. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.
51. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566 (analyzing House Committee Report that gives
guidance on how to interpret ambiguous language of Equal Access to Justice Act).
52. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988).
54. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 556.
55. Id. at 557.
56. Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1985); Underwood v.
Pierce, 802 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1986) (amending Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d
1342 (9th Cir. 1985)), cert. granted, Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
[Vol. 40: p. 93
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss1/2
THE ILLUSION AND ALLURE OF TEXTUALISM
most verbatim from the EAJA's legislative history. In its brief to the
Supreme Court, the government argued that "substantially justi-
fied" means "some substance and a fair possibility ofisuccess." 57 Re-
spondents argued that the phrase required a standard higher than
reasonableness and called for a "strong showing."58
Justice Scalia wrote that "substantially justified" is the text of
the statute that also operates as the governing legal standard or
test.5 9 Further, the statute gave courts explicit authority to inter-
pret and enforce these words.60 As such, no other formulation
could be substituted. 61 The Court's job is to determine the mean-
ing of the phrase. For this, he looked to the grammatical use of the
word "substantial" and with the assistance of a dictionary, deter-
mined that it had two almost conflicting meanings. 62 He found
that on the one hand it could mean "considerable," and on the
other, it refers to the "substance" or essence of a thing.63 Faced
with competing grammatical choices, he sought guidance from
other schemes using the word "substantial." The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)64 was consulted because of its use of the
phrase "substantial evidence."65 Justice Scalia determined that this
phrase, as used in the APA, meant relevant, adequate evidence -
not "large" or "considerable" evidence. 66 He then considered the
"substantially justified" language of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 67 This language was found to mean "genuine dispute" not
57. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 564 (citing Brief for Petitioner, at 16).
58. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents, at 24).
59. See id. (" 'Substantially justified' is the test the statute prescribes, and the
issue should be framed in those terms.").
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1) (A) (1988) ("[A] court shall award to a prevail-
ing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantiallyjustified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.").
61. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 564 ("In addressing this issue, we make clear at the
outset that we do not think it appropriate to substitute for the formula that Con-
gress has adopted any judicially crafted revision of it - whether that be 'reason-
able basis in both law and fact' or anything else.").
62. Id. Justice Scalia conceded that both the government's and Respondents'
interpretations were plausible depending on the connotation the word is given.
Id. This conclusion left the Court with flexibility to choose between competing
meanings. Exclusive reliance on a judge's view or value judgment at this point,
without guidance from legislative sources, facilitate judicial substitution of policy
that may contravene congressional intent.
63. Id.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994).
65. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 564.
66. Id. at 564-65.
67. Id. at 565 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4); (b)(2)(E)).
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'justified to a high degree."68 Armed with this information and
faced with two competing common connotations, he concluded
that the most natural meaning of substantial is 'justified in sub-
stance or in the main."69
Justice Scalia further rejected the analysis of those courts that
relied on a House Committee Report in concluding that "substan-
tially justified" means a higher standard than reasonableness. 70
Starting from the textualist premise that enacted legislation is the
exclusive embodiment of the law, Justice Scalia noted that interpre-
tive responsibility then fell on courts, not Committees of the House
of Representatives. 71 As such, reliance on a Committee's interpre-
tation is essentially an abdication of judicial responsibility to inter-
pret the statute. Although he concluded that clear congressional
command found in the legislative history may sometimes surmount
common connotation, the potential for such an occurrence is
daunted by his countervailing rationale that only judges can inter-
pret the law.72
III. JUSTICE SCALIA'S TEXTUALIST MALPRACTICE
In many instances, Justice Scalia departs from the Pierce format
by relying on the very construction approaches he condemns,
although he is careful to couch his analysis in textualist terms. In
fact, his departure from text-focused analysis is so flagrant at times
that his decisions become irreconcilable. Justice Scalia's infidelities
to textualism are very clear in the civil rights area.7 3 Several deci-
sions he wrote or participated in which affect disadvantaged individ-
uals provide sound examples. Take for example Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,74 an opinion Justice Scalia au-
thored, in which he interpreted the fee-shifting provision of Title
VII. At issue was whether plaintiffs can receive attorney's fees from
68. Id. (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a)(4) (1970 advisory committee's notes)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 566-67.
71. Id. at 566 ("[I]t is the function of the courts and not the Legislature,
much less a Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted
statute means.").
72. Id.
73. The Court's narrow interpretation of civil rights statutes has been cited in
the past as some evidence that textualism may be a ploy to derail liberal legislation.
See Mashaw, supra note 2, at 834. Further, inconsistencies in Justice Scalia's inter-
pretation of the Constitution have been noted. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right
of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and The Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1323, 1384-87 (1991).
74. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
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losing intervenors. 75 The provision, section 706(k), provided in rel-
evant part, that a "court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 76
The prevailing party provision in section 706(k) does not ap-
pear to be ambiguous. It is unlikely that a reader of these words
will find grammatical conflict. The instruction to a reviewing court
is clear. The words are written in directory as opposed to
mandatory language. In everyday usage, "may" is commonly used
and understood as a grant of permission. It is also defined that way
in the dictionary77 and has the same meaning in legal parlance. 78
The same is true of the use and understanding of the phrase "pre-
vailing party" in the legal context. It is generally understood to
mean the individual who successfully advocates his or her claim in
litigation. 79 Hence, the actual and literal meaning appears to be
the same. One can fairly conclude this language is "plain" without
reference to dictionaries. Even more, consulting a dictionary inevi-
tably leads to the same conclusion as an analysis confined exclu-
sively to text. Therefore, a determination that this language is
"plain" seems unavoidable.
Justice Scalia, however, found that the language of section
75. Id. at 755.
76. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988)).
77. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcrIONARY 734 (1986) (defining
'may" as, among other things, having permission, power, or ability to do a particu-
lar thing).
78. BLAcK's LAW DIcrIoNARY 979 (6th ed. 1990). The word "may" is defined
as:
(a] n auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing
ability, competency, liberty, permission, possibility, probability or contin-
gency. [The wiord 'may' usually is employed to imply permissive, op-
tional, or discretional, and not mandatory action or conduct. Regardless
of the instrument, however, whether constitution, statute, deed, contract
or whatever, courts not infrequently construe 'may' as 'shall' or 'must' to
the end that justice may not be the slave of grammar. However, as a gen-
eral rule, the word 'may' will not be treated as a word of command unless
there is something in context or subject matter of act to indicate that it
was used in such sense. In construction of statutes and presumably also
in construction of federal rules word 'may' as opposed to 'shall' is indica-
tive of discretion or choice between two or more alternatives, but context
in which word appears must be controlling factor.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 1188. Black's Law Dictionary notes the importance of interpreting
this phrase in civil rights cases, and defines it as "It]he party to a suit who success-
fully prosecutes the action or successfully defends against it, prevailing on the
main issue, even though not necessarily to the extent of his original contention.
The one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and judgment entered."
Id. (citation omitted).
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706(k) was not plain.80 It is important to be mindful of the fact that
as a textualist, he uses a broad definition of "plain""' and had re-
marked on at least one occasion, that Title VII was "a model of
statutory draftsmanship."8 2 By determining that the language was
not "plain," he was able to trump the text with judicial canons of
construction. To advance his interpretation,Justice Scalia relied on
the American Rule that winners are not usually entitled to fees from
losers and the principle that fee liability and merits liability run to-
gether.83 Additionally, he cited case law for the proposition that
losing parties' interests may sometimes take precedence over the
interests of a prevailing party and supplied his own assessment that
the text did not say that the prevailing party's interest is first and
foremost.84
Undaunted, Justice Scalia worked further destruction to the
text by inverting the permission evidenced by the word "may" and
converting it to "may not," thereby disregarding congressional hos-
tility to categorical rules in the fee shifting area.8 5 He continued his
interpretation "in light of the competing equities that Congress
normally takes into account,"86 arguing that his interpretation
served "congressional policy in favor of 'vigorous' adversary pro-
ceedings."87 Rather than be governed by the statute's "prevailing
party" standard, Justice Scalia substituted his own test for determin-
ing the losing intervenor's liability. He interpreted the statute to
80. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758
(1989).
81. See, e.g., Unites States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (suggesting that text may be "plain" without specific language relevant to
issue).
82. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). ChiefJustice Burger made the same observation about Title VII in his
dissent in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), by stating that Title
VII is a "statute of extraordinary clarity." Weber, 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
83. Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 (stating that "[i]n the United States the prevailing
litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the
loser").
84. Id. at 760 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418
(1978), for proposition that conceded statutory goals must compete with other con-
siderations to determine what statute means).
85. See id. at 760-61.
86. Id. at 761. The consideration of matters that Congress typically considers
is a bitter irony, because Justice Scalia is unwilling to rely on information coming
directly from Congress. His ability to discern what the entire Congress normally
considers is questionable, and his willingness to utilize factors that went into the
enactment of the statute raised questions of the judicial policymaking he so vigor-
ously cautions against.
87. Id. at 766 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418
(1978)).
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require frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded behavior on the part
of intervenors, before they may be held responsible for plaintiffs'
attorney's fees. 88 He concluded that his interpretation was war-
ranted even if it frustrated Congressional goals, because the losing
party in this case did not violate the law.8 9
Not only did Justice Scalia substitute interpretive guides and
his personal judgment for that of plain text, but his assessment of
congressional goals was not grounded in any specific evidence. On
this matter, there was probative legislative history that established
that Congress intended to confer discretion on trial court judges
with the objective of making discrimination victims whole. 90 Con-
gress ranked plaintiffs highest in the fee recovery scheme and pro-
vided them with a source of fees to facilitate vindication of their
rights.91 "By contrast, several fee-shifting statutes outside the civil
rights field specify that attorney's fees are available only upon a
showing of injury in violation of the underlying statute."92 Justice
Scalia's placement of intervenors on the same level as plaintiffs up-
set congressional ranking, although he was aware that intervenors
essentially function as plaintiffs' adversaries in Title VII proceed-
ings.93 Hence, he placed rules of construction over text, context
and reliable historical evidence of purpose and goals. This method-
ology is obviously arbitrary, particularly because it is grounded in an
equally unreasonable conclusion that the language is not "plain."
In another case, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,94 Justice Scalia
rejected "a plausible, and perhaps even the most natural reading of
88. Id. at 761 (holding award of attorney's fees, under Title VII, against losing
intervenors is only applicable when "intervenors' action was frivolous, unreasona-
ble or without foundation").
89. See id. at 762. Literal disregard of congressional goals appears to be a
greater abdication of judicial responsibility than reliance on legislative history to
achieve congressional goals that plain text controverts.
90. Id. at 773 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 773 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
[Wihile the majority pays lipservice to the objectives of Title VII, it is
guilty of establishing its own 'Judge-made ranking of rights." By elevating
intervenors to the same plane as Title VII plaintiffs, the majority under-
mines Congress' determination that Title VII plaintiffs alone are "the
chosen instruments" for vindicating the national policy against
discrimination.
Id. at 774 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 776 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 763 n.4 (acknowledging that intervenors enter lawsuits to defend
their own statutory or constitutional rights).
94. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
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section 703(h)"95 of Title VII, in favor of Court precedent. In
Lorance, Justice Scalia also interpreted the statute of limitations pro-
vision of section 706(e) that required plaintiffs to file a charge
"within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred." 96 At issue was a facially neutral seniority policy
that had discriminatory effects.97 Because the policy was fair in
form, employees were unaware of its potential consequences as im-
plemented. Justice Scalia had to determine when the wrongful
practice "occurred."98
In interpreting section 706(e), Justice Scalia did not conclude
that the text was plain. This conclusion seems reasonable because
the word "occurred" is not self defining. This is particularly true for
the use of the word occurred in legal settings. Justice Scalia recog-
nized that in enacting the legislation, Congress had to engage in a
value judgment between two competing interests.99 He phrased the
competing interests in neutral legal terms as a balance between the
rationales for allowing valid claims and barring stale ones. 100 This
meant weighing the interest of employees to be free from discrimi-
nation and the interest of employers to be free from the sanctions
of antidiscrimination laws.101 Justice Scalia interpreted section
706(e) to mean that the statute of limitations begins to run from
the time the policy was adopted, 02 even though employees may not
be aware, affected or harmed at that time. For context, he used the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)103 and case law interpreting
it, concluding that the similarities of the two statutes supported this
approach.10 4 Curiously, this approach facilitated an avoidance of
the purposes and goals of Title VII to protect discrimination vic-
tims. It also served as a rationale for rejecting the continuing viola-
tion rule, a doctrine that was developed and accepted by most
courts and recognized as a reliable rule. 0 5
95. Id. at 908.
96. Id. at 904 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988)).
97. Id. at 903.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 911.
100. Id. Justice Scalia recognized the general purpose of § 706(e) which is to
provide a "value judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of
protecting valid claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecu-
tion of stale" claims. Id.
101. Id. at 911-12.
102. Id.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
104. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 909-10.
105. Id. at 905-07; see Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1986) (hold-
ing that pattern or practice that would have constituted violation of Title VII be-
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In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,'0 6 Justice Scalia joined Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which pro-
vides that:
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of -all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other. 0 7
At issue in Patterson was whether section 1981's prohibition of dis-
crimination in the makeup and enforcement of contracts protected
workers from on-the-job discrimination.108
Although § 1981 is not a model in draftsmanship, Justice Scalia
joined the Court's opinion which found that the language of § 1981
was "plain." He adopted the Court's construction that "make"
means "form," and therefore, § 1981 only policed discriminatory re-
fusals to contract or offers to contract on discriminatory terms.109
He also agreed that "enforce" means "redress," and therefore,
§ 1981 only policed a discriminatory ban to legal processes.1 0 Fur-
ther, he joined the Court's conclusion that neither semantics nor
logic supported a different interpretation."'
Readers of § 1981 will likely be surprised to learn that it is so
clear. The text does not say make "employment" contracts, and the
words "sue," "be parties," and "give evidence," that come after "en-
forcement" may logically be read as additional rights, as opposed to
came violation upon Title VII's effective date, and to extent that employer
continued prohibited practice, liability attached); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363, 380-81 (1982) (declaring that claims based not solely on isolated
incidents, but rather on continuing violations manifested in numerous incidents
are timely under § 812(a) of Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 (1988),
provided that one incident is asserted to have occurred within 180-day period);
Coming Glassware v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974) (finding continuing viola-
tion of Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1988), when employer, after
effective date of Act, continued to pay female day inspectors less than male night
inspectors for equal work).
106. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
108. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 170-71.
109. Id. at 176-77 (interpreting right to "make" contracts to mean "formation"
of contracts).
110. Id. at 177-78.
111. Id. at 177.
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a description of enforcement rights. 112 The remainder of the text
is even more cumbersome. The Court's finding that the text is
"plain," is therefore quite curious. Semantics and logic become es-
pecially useful when interpreting controversial legislation such as
civil rights laws. But even more critical is honesty in admitting that
language is cloudy and that it requires readers to resort to reliable
legislative guides for clarification.
Other issues of construction had to be resolved in Patterson. It
was clear to the Court that there was some overlap between § 1981
and Title VII." 3 To resolve the overlap, the Court utilized its own
rule that an earlier statute (§ 1981) should not be read broadly
when this would circumvent the detailed remedial scheme of a later
statute (Title VII). 114 The court chose this over the more recog-
nized rule that when statutes overlap, a court is not at liberty " 'to
infer any positive preference for one over the other.' "115 The
Court decided that its construction made the two statutory schemes
coherent, and observed that in the event it was wrong, Congress
could change the language.116
Congress obliged in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.117 The Jus-
tices in Patterson refused to work diligently with frail language and
instead infused their personal sense of what the legislation meant.
They also avoided compelling rules of construction and abandoned
probative historical context in an apparent quest to limit employ-
ees' civil rights.118 To achieve this goal, the Court had to reject the
construction that "make" arguably covers postformation conduct by
the employer "that demonstrates that the contract was not really
made on equal terms at all."119 The Court also had to sidestep
expansive legislative history of textual evolution showing that Con-
gress rejected an amendment to Title VII that would have fore-
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993).
113. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181 (finding conduct that is covered by both § 1981
and Title VII leads to some necessary overlap).
114. Id. at 181.
115. Id. (quotingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461
(1975)).
116. Id. at 182.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993).
118. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The legislative
history of § 1981 - to which the Court does not advert - makes clear that we
must not take an overly narrow view of what it means to have the 'same right... to
make and enforce contracts' as white citizens.").
119. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted the majority's
rejection of § 1981 coverage of postformation conduct and rejected it on the
grounds that the language of § 1981 is "quite naturally" read as extending to such
postformation coverage. Id.
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closed the use of § 1981 to remedy employment discrimination
claims, and further that Congress specifically noted that the two
statutes protected similar rights, although detailing different pre-
requisites for filing.120
In addition to Patterson, Justice Scalia has demonstrated similar
proclivities in other cases that further substantiate the claims of his
critics that his methodology is more a tool for manipulation than
the mandate of textualism. Another case that effectively highlights
Justice Scalia's interpretive practices is Lukhard v. Reed.121 Lukhard
presented ideal facts for a true textualist. At issue was a federal
statute which required that a family's "income" and "resources" be
considered in determining its eligibility for benefits under the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 12 2 program. The Vir-
ginia Department of Social Services, through implementing regula-
tions, decided to treat personal injury awards as income as opposed
to resources.123 Personal injury award recipients adversely affected
by the regulation sued, utilizing a textualist methodology of statu-
tory construction.1 24
The recipients (respondents) argued that income should be
given its ordinary meaning which did not include personal injury
awards.125 For support, they turned to common speech through
which income is understood as a gain or profit.1 26 In addition, re-
spondents pointed to a dictionary definition that also defined in-
come as a form of gain or profit.1 27 Further, they demonstrated
that legal sources also regard income as a gain.1 28 Logically, re-
spondents concluded that personal injury awards could not be in-
come because it was compensatory in nature and therefore does
not involve gain.1 29 For a true textualist, the matter would have
ended here with a ruling in favor of respondents. Justice Scalia was
not persuaded.
Respondents proposed other arguments to persuade the
Court. They consulted analogous statutory schemes and other pro-
120. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121. 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1988).
123. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 373.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 374.
127. Id. at 375.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 374.
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visions utilizing the word "income."130 Specifically, they referenced
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),131 the Food Stamp Program,13 2
and United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) guidelines.' 3 3 All three schemes exempted personal injury
awards from their definitions of income.13 4 This substantial show-
ing of the meaning of income under other schemes would have
persuaded even a hybrid textualist to agree with the respondents'
interpretation. Such a conclusion was especially compelling be-
cause the respondents identified schemes that regulated the
"needy," making those schemes textually and structurally similar to
the scheme before the Court. However, Justice Scalia remained
unconvinced.
Respondents went even further to prove their point. They
cited clear administrative command by noting that HHS had always
taken the position that personal injury awards were not income.135
Furthermore, Congress knew of HHS' position when it used the
word income in the statute. 136 Justice Scalia was still unpersuaded.
His resolve is particularly troublesome because the statute provided
plain language that neatly addressed personal injury awards. The
word "resources" in the statute appeared plainly designed as a cate-
gory capturing personal injury awards and this interpretation com-
fortably fits with common understanding of income and non-
income awards.137
Not only did Justice Scalia fail to follow textualist command, he
engaged in textualist-forbidden conduct. First, he refused to con-
cede to the commonly-accepted interpretation that income is gain
and instead offered his personal explanation that personal injury
awards are in some respects compensation for loss of gain, and at
least to that extent, must also be income.138 With respect to respon-
dents' contextual reference to statutory schemes, Justice Scalia sim-
ply turned the analysis on its head. He concluded that because
these other schemes specifically excluded personal injury awards
from income, congressional silence in the AFDC statute was evi-
130. Id. at 376-77.
131. Id. at 376 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1988)).
132. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2104(d)(8) (1994)).
133. Id. (citing 48 Fed. Reg. 7,010-11 (1983)).
134. Id. (noting that all three provisions expressly provide that "personal in-
jury awards are not to be treated as income").
135. Id. at 377.
136. Id. at 379.
137. Id. at 374.
138. Id. at 375.
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dence of legislative intent to include such awards.' 3 9 In effect, he
allowed congressional silence to trump text, common usage and
similar schemes, which is an unworkable proposition for a textualist
faced with plain text. He then rejected clear congressional man-
date by finding that although Congress used the word income with
knowledge of its administrative interpretation, that interpretation
was not frozen in place. 140
Second, Justice Scalia committed another textualist sin in
Lukhard by relying on postenactment statements to support the in-
terpretation he favored.' 4 ' He stated, "[o]lder documents demon-
strating the existence of a longstanding interpretation would of
course be better evidence than are recent documents asserting its
existence. But in the absence of any contrary evidence, the latter
form of evidence is certainly sufficient to support a conclusion that
the interpretation existed."142 This conclusion is the antithesis of
his position in Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben,143 where he dispensed
with postenactment statements by writing, "[s] ince such statements
cannot possibly have informed the vote of the legislators who ear-
lier enacted the law, there is no more basis for considering them
than there is to conduct postenactment polls of the original legisla-
tors."' 44 Coincidentally, in Sebben, Justice Scalia rejected interim
Department of Labor regulations implementing The Black Lung
Benefits Reform Act of 1977,145 by opting for the dictionary defini-
tion of the word "criteria" used in the statute, instead of the inter-
pretation "medical criteria" for which the legislative history showed
clear congressional mandate.'4
More importantly, Justice Scalia appears poised to use his textu-
alism to undermine some civil rights statutory precedents. For ex-
ample, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,147 Justice Scalia called on
the Court to reconsider and overrule United Steelworkers v. Weber.148
The Weber Court had determined that Title VII did not forbid vol-
untary affirmative action plans.' 49 At issue in Weber were sections
139. Id. at 376.
140. Id. at 379.
141. Id. at 378.
142. Id. at 378 n.4.
143. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
144. Id. at 118-19.
145. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988).
146. Sebben, 488 U.S. at 113-15.
147. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
148. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
149. Id. at 203-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
18 (1963)). In Weber, the Court stated that: "[gliven this legislative history, we
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703(a) and (d) of Title VII, °5 0 which provide that it shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer or union to discrim-
inate against "any individual" because of his race.15' Urging the
rejection of Weber, Justice Scalia argued that the language of Title
VII is unambiguous in its protection of any individual, black or
white.152 Justice Scalia interpreted the text of the statute as outlin-
ing a color-blind and gender-blind scheme.153 Further, he argued
that overturning Weber would not violate principles supporting def-
erence to statutory precedents.154
In Johnson, Justice Scalia chided the Weber Court for upholding
a negotiated affirmative action plan between a company and union
designed to remedy the exclusion of blacks caused by craft union-
ism, arguing that the Court's interpretation was grounded in na-
ivete.1 55 He accused the Court of relying on "intangible guides"
such as the statute's spirit and legislative history to reach a result at
odds with "plain" text.15 6 Justice Scalia added, that "rudimentary
principles of political science" rebuffed the Court's premise that
congressional inaction supported its interpretation. 157
Justice Scalia's construction does not tell the whole story.
Although the words of sections 703(a) and (d) appear to be clear, a
literal application can lead to absurd results. The Weber Court's reli-
ance on statutory structure (context) and legislative history to sup-
port a conclusion that voluntary affirmative action plans are
permitted was not simply judicial substitution of judgment for that
of Congress. Rather, the Court's use of legislative history and con-
text to circumvent text parallels Justice Scalia's model for plain text
that produces absurd results when literally applied.
That Weber can survive textualist scrutiny is easily demonstrated
by utilizing Justice Scalia's textualist format outlined in Green.
cannot agree with respondent that Congress intended to prohibit the private sec-
tor from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress [desired]." Id.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 2(d) (1988).
151. Id.
152. Johnson v. Transporation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 669-77 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The Court had previously held that blacks and whites are afforded
Title VII's protections. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
280 n.8 (1976) ("Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.").
153. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. See id. at 672-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "stare decisis ought
not to save Webe?' because Weber has provided "little guidance" as to Title VII
interpretation).
155. See id. at 673-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Weber decision is
"rooted so firmly in naivete" that it must be incorrect).
156. Id. at 670 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 671-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Under the Green approach, a court is allowed to consult legislative
history to confirm that the statute does not mean what it says.' 58 A
review of the legislative history in Weberwould reveal that the statute
was enacted to remedy the plight of African-Americans in the work-
place and not as a guarantee of job opportunities for whites. 15 9
Having confirmed that the text could not mean what it says, that is,
that the interest of whites is first and foremost or the only interest
to consider, the Court is free to utilize the rule that when literal
interpretation of "plain" language would lead to absurd or harmful
results, such language will not be given effect. 160 Such is the case in
Weber, where, if Justice Scalia's interpretation is adopted, a statute
designed to protect a particular group would serve as an instrument
to deny the same group employment opportunities. 161
Unfortunately, the defects in a philosophy that turns its back
on plain text are apparent no matter how laudable its goals.
Whether parleyed under the guise of textualism, or purposes and
goals interpretation, text loses pre-eminence and subordinate com-
munications dominate. This is not necessarily bad because the leg-
islature may be presumed not to have intended an absurdity.
However, if the issue is one that the legislature had not foreseen,
the potential for judicial abuse begins to emerge.
IV. THEORIES, LEGIsLATIvE- HISTORY AND JUDICIAL MANIPULATION
Long before the phrase "new textualism" was coined, theories
have attempted to exorcise judges' personal philosophies and bi-
ases from the interpretive process. Ironically, theories tend not to
focus on the holder of the bias, but rather on the tools being used
and legal limitations on their use. As such, theories do not regulate
judges, they are only interpretive tools. Manipulation, therefore, is
limited only to the extent that judges lack creativity in utilizing their
arsenal of tools.
A. Formalism, Textualism and Legislative History
The new textualism associated with Justice Scalia can be re-
158. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
159. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). The Weber
Court opined that "it was clear to Congress that '[tihe crux of the problem [was]
to open employment opportunities for negroes.' " Id. at 203 (quoting 110 CONG.
REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
160. Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 403 (1950).
161. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-03.
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garded as a type of formalist thought with a twist. Early formalism
as a legal theory employed a deductive methodology whereby spe-
cific results could be deduced from abstract theories. 162 Applied in
this deductive fashion, formalists leave no room for consideration
of individual or unique factors or underlying policies.163 Formalists
argue that the law must always be applied in a logical, systematic
way without involving the judge's personal philosophies or
experience.1 64
Formalism emerged from legal formalism as a theory of statu-
tory construction.' 65 Modern formalists argue that consulting legis-
lative history in interpreting statutes is inconsistent with the
constitutional structure of the legislative process. 166 In support of
this argument, formalists contend that reliance on legislative his-
tory is equivalent to a legislative veto and therefore invalid because
it creates legislation by avoiding the constitutional requirements of
162. Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the For-
malfor the Function, 52 OHIo ST. LJ. 1037 (1991). This conclusion was based on
the belief that "a legal system is a collection of laws emanating from a sovereign
power and such laws, regardless of their social or moral consequence, are still valid
if enacted in due form." Id. at 1039 n.6.
163. Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988) (re-
view essay) (exploring how current theorists accept legal realism and how classical
formalism creeps back into legal discourse).
164. Swisher, supra note 162, at 1040; see also David Lyons, Legal Formalism and
Instrumentalism - A Pathological Study, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 949, 952 (1981)
("[S]ound legal decisions can be justified as the conclusions of valid deductive
syllogisms.").
165. Several other statutory interpretation theories are also traceable to early
formalist legal theory. Intentionalism and Imaginative Reconstruction are exam-
ples. As a principal theory of statutory interpretation, intentionalism was first em-
ployed in the context of constitutional interpretation. Intentionalism is premised
on the assumption of legislative supremacy, a belief that goes back to the Constitu-
tion's Separation of Powers doctrine, which does not allow courts to displace the
legislature. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 S. CAL.
L. REv. 919, 929-30 (1989) (review essay) (finding that both textualism and inten-
tionalism are built on core assumption of legislative supremacy). When interpret-
ing statutes, intentionalists consult legislative history to discern the purpose of the
statute rather than the intent of framers. Id.
Imaginative reconstruction, a strict form of intentionalism, proposes that "the
judge should try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure
out how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him." See
POSNER, supra note 27, at 286-87. Unlike strict formalism, imaginative reconstruc-
tion allows a judge to make policy choices when it is unclear whether the statute
applies. Id. Like formalism, however, this theory suggests that when interpreting a
statute, the judiciary should not exceed its powers. See id. (stating that when mak-
ing policy choices, the court must be guided, to the extent known, by what would
seem reasonable to legislators rather than what may seem reasonable to the court).
166. For a further discussion of formalists arguments against the use of legis-
lative history in statutory interpretation, see Eskridge, supra note 2, at 649.
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bicameralism and presentment. 167
Further, formalists argue that such reliance creates "strong in-
centives for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the
courts results not achievable during the enactment process."168 In
addition, the purpose behind the Presentment Clause is frustrated
if a statute is ultimately given meaning the President might not have
agreed to, because "[t] he President passes upon legislation, and as
a practical matter does so without the benefit of legislative his-
tory."169 Moreover, because formalists believe that judges dictate
the law which the sovereign commands, no room is left for judicial
subjectivity in cases of statutory interpretation.17 0 For formalists,
"[t] he law provides sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises.
There are no 'gaps' within the law, and there is but one sound legal
decision for each case. The law is complete and univocal.' ' 7'
Although the new textualists follow old formalist traditions of
strict separation of powers and rely on "objective data" instead of
legislative history, 172 it is argued that they part ways with old formal-
ists when assessing the role of congressional intent in interpreting
text. 173 Further, it is proposed that the new textualists bring more
flexibility to the plain meaning rule, broaden traditional canons of
construction and provide Congress with clearer interpretive gui-
dance while restraining judges from abusive interpretations. 174
The new textualism associated with Justice Scalia varies slightly
from old formalist thought in that the former considers the role of
congressional intent in interpreting certain texts. The two models,
167. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 649.
168. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DuKE L.J. 371, 376 ("The most compelling and widely discussed concern about the
use of legislative history is its potential for manipulation.").
169. Id. For a further discussion of Starr's theory and reservations about legis-
lative history, see Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 703 (1988) (discussing present-day judicial tendency to resort
to structuralism as interpretive methodology).
170. For a further explanation of the tenets of formalism, see Swisher, supra
note 162 and accompanying text.
171. See Lyons, supra note 164, at 950.
172. See Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Inter-
pretation of Statutes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 659-60 (1994) (observing that Justice
Scalia avoids legislative history in order to determine objective meaning of statute
versus subjective intentions of legislators).
173. Id.
174. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 656-67 (noting that textualist approach to
statutory interpretation limits opportunity for judicial lawmaking). Eskridge fur-
ther explains three ways in which Justice Scalia's textualism has manifested itself in
recent Supreme Court decisions: 1) revival and greater adherence to the plain
meaning rule; 2) use of more structured, textual arguments in statutory interpreta-
tion; and 3) use of the traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Id.
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however, share the same theoretical roots and desire to shun legis-
lative history. The strong common thread running between the two
theories is adherence to the separation of powers doctrine. A care-
ful reading of Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison illustrates this simi-
larity. Justice Scalia's contention that judges are constitutionally
out of bounds when they search through and rely on legislative his-
tory has been refuted. 175 Further, there is no proof that policymak-
ing abuses are deterred by Justice Scalia's separation of powers
model. In addition, Justice Scalia's methodology for determining
what is purely executive, as articulated in the Morrison decision, is
not entirely persuasive. 176
A deeper concern is whetherJustice Scalia is advocating a sepa-
ration of powers theory as rationale for his analysis in particular
cases. Because there is no consistency in application, doubts sur-
face about separation of powers precepts as the driving force for his
textualist construction. It could be that Justice Scalia is seeking a
more fundamental change in the way we look at federalism, which,
incidentally, coincides with textualist construction. That is, all pow-
ers to the executive (those who appointJustices to the Court), more
powers to the Court (those who are bright enough to divine and
make policy), and less deference to Congress (those who are insti-
tutionally incapable of conveying intent).
One need only go to Justice Scalia's record to confirm that the
separation of powers model has not deterred judicial abuse. In the-
ory, Justice Scalia's approach may deter judicial abuse to a greater
extent than an interpretive methodology that routinely considers
legislative history or other extratextual materials. However, Justice
Scalia evades framers' intent by using his own faculties and meth-
ods to impart meaning on text.177 Unfortunately forJustice Scalia,
deviations from true textual methodology are readily noticeable
and the reader is soon apprised that something other than a princi-
pled philosophy is motivating the analysis.
Under an approach that routinely considers legislative history,
support could generally be found for various alternative proposi-
tions because of the competing interests that participate in the leg-
175. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 671-73 (stating that separation of powers
principles do not command abandonment of legislative history).
176. See Ross, supra note 12, at 304-05 (stating that strong argument against
Justice Scalia's classification of prosecutorial function as purely executive can be
made based on express provisions of Constitution, as well as substantial historical
evidence).
177. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989) (adopt-
ing strict construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)).
[Vol. 40: p. 93
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islative process. Reliance on unreliable enactment data made the
interpretive process somewhat unprincipled.17 8 Justice Scalia's ap-
plication of textualism is equally unprincipled, however, because
his interpretation is limited only by the range of his intellect and
common sense. Although intellect and common sense may be valu-
able attributes in the field of statutory interpretation, they are no
substitute for the words of the statute as contextualized by the legis-
lative history. Fidelity to a broad plain-meaning approach that ex-
pands and circumvents approved text and allows substitution of
personal context is also unreliable.
B. The Resilience of Legislative History
The theoretical attack on legislative history has had only a neg-
ligible influence on judges and an even smaller impact on Con-
gress. 179 Judges continue to use legislative history routinely and
Congress clearly contemplates its continued use. In fact, Congress
is even setting aside exclusive legislative history for some statutory
provisions.180 The Executive also considers and uses legislative his-
tory81 and has increasingly moved into the business of making its
178. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523,
551 (1992) (observing that extensive use of legislative history in 1980s resulted in
intense judicial attacks).
179. Id. at 552-53.
180. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. III 1991) (Note on
Legislative History for 1991 Amendment). Section 105(b) of Pub. L. 102-166
provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at
Vol. 137 Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be
considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative
history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to
Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
Id. The memorandum referred to states, in relevant part:
The final compromise on S. 1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors,
including Senators Danforth, Kennedy, and Dole, and the Administration
states that with respect to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/al-
ternative business practice - the exclusive legislative history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and 'job related" are intended to reflect
the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior
to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
181. See, e.g., President's Signing Statement for the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(on file with author) (recognizing that President Bush took position that memo-
randum inserted into record of Civil Rights Act of 1991 by Senator Dole provided
correct interpretation of that statute's position on affirmative action). Senator
Dole's memo essentially said that the 1991 Act did not resolve the issue of whether
affirmative action programs are legal. See 137 CONG. Rc. S15,477-78 (daily ed.
Oct. 30, 1991).
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own.182 Over time, legislative history has maintained its role and
importance despite longstanding claims of constitutional infir-
mity18 3 and quips by foreign critics.
18 4
Judge Wald observed that the texts of statutes are increasingly
complex, thereby making the job of interpretation an ever-chal-
lenging one.185 She added that this responsibility requires con-
text,18 6 in addition to principled creativity, common sense and an
open mind.18 7 Her observation that the plain text cases typically
do not make it to court is a telling indictment for the textualist who
regularly concludes that text is plain.188 Justice Breyer's conclusion
that there is little conflict in the legislative history of most statutes
that courts interpret further dilutes the textualists' desire to banish
legislative history.189
Because of multiple competing forces, sometimes unspoken,
that affect legislators' choices, there is good reason for caution
when a judge sets out to discover collective legislative intent.1 90
This reality was factored into earlier theories of statutory construc-
tion.19 1 However, theories of statutory construction cannot factor
182. William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique,
66 IND. L.J. 699, 704-05 (1991) (noting that under President Reagan, Attorney
General Meese elevated stature of presidential signing statements to legislative his-
tory by securing their inclusion in United States Code Congressional and Adminis-
trative News (U.S.C.CA.N.). These statements were then used by President
Reagan to advance his personal agenda for particular statutes).
183. For a further discussion of the role and importance of legislative history,
see Starr, supra note 168, at 378.
184. J. A. Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32
CANADIAN B. REv. 624, 636 (1954) ("The frequent reliance of the federal courts in
the United States on legislative history has prompted the jibe that the court will
not look at the act unless the legislative history is obscure!").
185. See Wald, supra note 3, at 304-05.
186. Id. at 302.
187. Id. at 303.
188. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 20, 23 (1988) ("Contextual analysis is necessary as a matter of semantics
(words have no 'plain meaning'; meaning depends on context and usage.).").
189. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 862 (1992). Justice Breyer then stated the obvious, i.e., if the
legislative history presents serious conflicts or is vague, do not use it. Id.
190. See id. at 864-67 (noting that although legislative intent is sometimes dif-
ficult to ascertain, it is judicial tool that can be justified, at least in part, by its ability
to help judges interpret statutes). I agree with justice Breyer that there is such a
thing as legislative intent although, at times, it may be difficult to identify.
191. In the late nineteenth century, legal realism emerged in direct opposi-
tion to formalism. The realist did not view the law as being deduced from a higher
source or a timeless absolute, but rather as a consequence of social desires and
purposes. See GARYJ. AICHELE,. LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 16-21 (1990) (noting Holmes' emphasis upon historical knowledge
and his distaste for proposition that only force at work in development of law is
[Vol. 40: p. 93
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out the judge's personal value system which is the birthplace of the-
ory manipulation. 192 The preceding analysis of Justice Scalia's tex-
tualism shows that despite its theoretic prophylactic attributes,
susceptibility to manipulation remains an overriding concern when
discerning the meaning of legislation. As a result, the judge's deci-
sion seems tailored to achieving social and political consequences
commanded by his or her predispositions or current value system. 193
Concededly, legislative history has been abused in the past and
remains subject to manipulation in the future. However, a convinc-
ing case for its total exclusion or abandonment is yet to be made. 94
Significant evidence of abuse under the rubric of textualism and
irreconcilable conflicts support a conclusion that Justice Scalia is
not offering a better tool of construction. A more logical explana-
tion for his departure from the traditional model seems to be the
flexibility that advocating textualism gives in making law and shap-
ing policy. To the extent that a new textualism exists, contextual
rules are as important as focusing on text because of the interpre-
tive responsibility ajudge assumes when construing the language of
a statute. To paraphrase one commentator on this subject, judges
should not be free to read the notes of a song written by Congress
without listening to the music. 195
logic). Applied to statutory interpretation, the realist believes that a collective leg-
islative intent is undiscoverable and legislative history is useless because one can-
not tell why one draft was chosen over another. See Max Radin, Statutoly
Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 870, 873 (1930). Historicists have similar be-
liefs. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 644 ("To reconstruct a past event (especially
something as difficult as a collective state of mind) involves selection of evidence,
arrangement of the evidence, and interpretation of the evidence.").
192. Realists reject the use of canons in statutory construction because of
their susceptibility to manipulation and instead suggest that statutes be interpreted
in light of their purpose. See Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 400-03. Further, in
order to determine the statute's purpose, the judge should be given leeway so as to
achieve a result that is beneficial to society. See Radin, supra note 191, at 884
("What is desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what satisfies the social
emotions of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of society which he
entertains.").
193. Historicists believe that our own interpretations, views and predisposi-
tions are influenced by the present. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 644. Historicism,
grounded in principles of hermeneutics and modem historiography, recognize
that the interpreter chooses the interpretation most consistent with her own value
system, or the interpretation that portrays the past more complexly. Id. Under
principles of hermeneutics, interpretation involves an interaction between the text
and the interpreter; therefore, past intent cannot be reconstructed and the views
of the interpreter must come into play. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 619-21 (1990).
194. See Breyer, supra note 189, at 869 (arguing that judges' misuse of legisla-
tive history is not frequent enough to warrant completely ignoring it).
195. See Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 399 ("But a court must strive to make
sense as a whole out of our law as a whole. It must.., take the music of any statute
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C. The Human Factor
Theories of statutory interpretation are seemingly advanced on
the premise that judges are static human beings who desire a princi-
pled format for construing text. It could be, however, thatjudges are
more interested in a convincing result that revolves around their
sense of rightness, rather than the tools they employ for reaching
the desired answer. This may partly explain why, despite the exten-
sive arguments made against the consideration and reliance on leg-
islative history, its use remains routine. The integrity that non-use
brings to the interpretive process is apparently outweighed by the
conviction that its use is correct and beneficial. And, from a consti-
tutional standpoint, Congress clearly contemplates consideration
and use of pre-Act materials.
A shift in focus from theoretical rules that may seem unfamiliar
or incorrect to judges to an evolutionary reality of what the judge is
or has become through education, training and experience may ad-
just our expectations of judges and the characterization of their in-
terpretive product. Failure of theory to control interpretation is
partly traceable to the constricted theme of viewing the Court as a
single independent entity. It could be that such cabining is neces-
sary to create the lab conditions for a theory to operate. However,
such confinement severely constricts the definition of what is princi-
pled to an almost utopian magnitude, thereby guaranteeing failure
in theory implementation in almost every instance.
Although constitutionally separated from the Executive
Branch and Congress, a functional analysis of the Court's construc-
tion of a statute should include these two branches. In addition to
reading the text of a statute, it may also be necessary to consult the
legislative history and inquire about the President's views in order
to understand a law which has its birthplace in and is infected by
the political process. To exclude such influences can only create
false expectations and force conclusions that decisions are irra-
tional, irreconcilable or unprincipled.
If one accepted judicial conviction of rightness over theory as
an overarching force and broadened the definition of principled to
include the gross product of forces that affect interpretation, then
the process of construction becomes a more acceptable one. Thus,
a liberal or conservative dominated construction does not have to
be labeled judicial activism because its origins cannot be traced to
as written by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as written by the
legislature.").
[Vol. 40: p. 93
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some respected theory. Rather, such interpretation may be treated
as the most principled one the court is capable of at that time. But
the matter does not have to end there. Congress is free to put its
imprimatur on or disagree with the interpretation, through acqui-
escence or amendments, thereby buttressing its rationality or de-
stroying its legal value. 196
Debate between the Justices motivated by rightness (albeit
couched in interpretive rules), as opposed to an overriding theory,
brings out the reasoned choices available. Although this process
inevitably produces winners and losers, it does not compel a conclu-
sion that the process or product is unprincipled. Even if dissenters
are armed with persuasive theories of construction in support of
their positions, their loss is not irremediable or unnoticed. While
immediate support may not be found in Congress or the President,
the constant cycle of that statute's meaning remains in motion.
Further, the dissenters or majority may adjust their positions as they
evolve as humans.
Over the years, Supreme Court Justices have been labeled as,
among other things, liberals, moderates and conservatives. The la-
bels reflect judicial philosophy as evidenced by the Justices' opin-
ions. However, judicial philosophy, fashioned from general social,
political and economic philosophies, traces its roots to places very
distant from the Supreme Court. And, to the extent a Justice is
controlled by precast views, the likelihood of truly objective deci-
sion-making is reduced to an illusion.
Justice Scalia is labeled a conservative. This label associates
him on a general level with the social, political and economic
agenda of conservatives. As such, he is expected to protect con-
servative ideals. On a judicial level, the label is used to predict his
position on such issues as the powers of the national government
versus the states, equal protection clause, affirmative action and the
rights of criminal defendants.' 97
196. Justice Scalia recognizes that congressional inaction is not proof that the
Court's interpretation is right because of the numerous reasons why Congress may
fail to act. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987)
(Scalia,J., dissenting) ("The majority's response to this criticism of Weber... asserts
that, since 'Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, ....
we ... may assume that our interpretation was correct.' This assumption, which
frequently haunts our opinions, should be put to rest."). However, this reality cuts
both ways and Justice Scalia's incorrect interpretations would also benefit from
congressional inaction.
197. See, e.g., RONALD DWOPMN, LAw's EmPiRE 357-59 (1986) (noting thatJus-
tices are labeled liberal or conservative depending on their personal theories of
constitutional interpretation and their standards in judging official acts). Con-
servative interpretation is typically tied to convictions about the Framers' intent
1995]
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For Justice Scalia, as for mostJustices, the labels typically with-
stand the most searching scrutiny. 198 Although he is not electorally
accountable, partisan political and other societal forces will likely
play a role in his interpretation of statutes.1 99 Justice Scalia's per-
sonal convictions are tempered, however, by built-in accountability
and the views associated with political conservatives, while liberal interpretation is
not. Id.; Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal" Romance, Community, and Tradition in
Williamj Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1263 n.10 (1991)
(noting that "what is primarily distinctive in liberal constitutional thought is the
prominence and general priority it accords to individual civil and political rights
against the state," and concluding thatJustice Brennan is liberal by any definition).
198. The scholarly debates have endured about howJustices made their deci-
sions in particular cases. One often-used beginning point for analysis has always
been the Supreme Court appointments process. There is ample evidence that
Presidents screen and nominate candidates that share their conservative or liberal
philosophy. See generally LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 74
(1985) (noting that Presidents attempt to shape Supreme Court by predicting how
particular candidates will vote in future based on candidate's past behavior); Don-
ald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of Constitutional Roles
and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1986) (outlining significance of Presi-
dent's ideology in nomination process and Senate's necessary response).
Although there appears to be agreement that personal and professional quali-
fications (training, experience, temperament, intellectual capacity, morality)
ought to be key factors in selection, inquires about a nominee's policy values
abound because selection is often tied to partisan politics. See Bruce A. Ackerman,
Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164, 1169 n.9 (1988) (noting that
President Eisenhower appointed Justice Brennan for political symbolism); Stephen
Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1185, 1189 (1988) (noting that
after Dred Scott decision, nominees had to prove their antislavery sentiments); Paul
A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARv. L. REv.
1146, 1148-56 (1988) (noting that parochialism and partisanship shaped early ap-
pointments with Justice Brandeis being opposed for his social and economic views,
and confirmed strictly along party lines, and Judge Carswell's nomination being
defeated partly because of his racial bias).
Although some Justices have surprised or even disappointed the President
that selected them, Justices have typically met the substantive expectations of the
selecting President. See Lively, supra, at 556-62 (identifying numerous Presidents
who left indelible marks on the American legal landscape through ideological
screening that included consideration of friendship, age, race, geography, reli-
gion, party affiliation, views on affirmative action, family values, human life and
judicial restraint). But see HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrru-
TION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 150 (1990) (observ-
ing that it is difficult to forecast Supreme Court nominee's perspectives); Orrin G.
Hatch, Save The Court From What, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1347, 1356-58 (1986) (noting
that judicial responsibility requires that judges lay aside their personal views and be
objective, and that there is evidence which demonstrates that Justices contravene
or fail to meet expectations of appointing Presidents).
199. WELLINGTON, supra note 198, at 59-60 (stating thatJustices are capable of
detached perspective because they are not electorally accountable or subject to
interest group pressures, but originalism does not eliminate judges' personal pref-
erences); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REv. 781, 784 (1983) (judges, like legislators, are
political actors motivated by personal values and self-interest).
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considerations that help shape long-term judicial legitimacy.200
D. Textualist Construction with Liberal Results
To help overcome the conservative majoritarian critique, sup-
porters of textualism point to instances when its application has
produced liberal results.20 1 At its most basic level, the suggestion is
that if Justice Scalia can come out on the same side as liberal Jus-
tices and even reject the construction of other conservative Justices,
this further evidences the objectivity of his methodology. Such an
analysis is of course much too superficial.
First, Justice Scalia's badge as a conservative does not mean or
require that he hold conservative views or reach conservative results
in every case.20 2 To be labeled a conservative does not mean to
hold exclusively conservative views. Second, Justice Scalia's agree-
ment with opinions written by liberals does not automatically mean
that the results are liberal. Understandably, conservative Justices
sometimes reach liberal results and vice versa. Third, not all con-
servative Justices share Justice Scalia's brand of construction,
thereby making disagreement with fellow conservatives less telling.
Further, a close examination of the cases cited for "deployment of
textualism with liberal results" leaves interpretive doubt as to
whether textualism was even deployed, much less whether the re-
sults were liberal or conservative.
1. Family Law
Rose v. Rose20 3 is a family law case cited for the liberal results
proposition. The case deals with a veteran's obligation to pay child
support from benefits received from the Veterans' Administration.
The backdrop of this case is a state court proceeding where the
veteran (husband) was ordered to pay child support out of veter-
ans' benefits, his exclusive source of income. 20 4 The court order
was pitted against a variety of federal statutes lodging in the Admin-
istrator of Veterans' Affairs' exclusive authority to apportion disabil-
200. Realists and critical legal scholars have recognized that although socio-
political forces instead of legal reasoning may drive a particular decision, factors
such as common sense, legal culture and custom protect against arbitrariness. See
Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards; Nihilism and Legal Theoy, 94 YALE LJ. 1
(1984) (outlining why "traditional legal theory" has failed as result of its determi-
native, objective and neutral decision procedures).
201. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 669 n.193; Mashaw, supra note 2, at 835.
202. See RONALD DwoRKIN, A MArrER OF PmNCIPL 187-88 (1985) (noting
that label does not require that one hold all positions of group).
203. 481 U.S. 619 (1987).
204. Id. at 622-23.
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ity benefits on behalf of children,205 and provisions protecting the
veteran's benefits from attachment, levy or seizure.20 6
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall concluded that use of
service-connected disability income under the state statute to com-
pute child support did not conflict with and was not pre-empted by
the federal regulatory scheme. 20 7 Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, finding that none of the federal statutes relied on by the
veteran prohibited a state court from using the veteran's benefits in
computing child support payments and enforcing an award
through civil contempt proceedings. 20 Justice Scalia's concur-
rence in the judgement does nothing to legitimize his textualism
205. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (Supp. V. 1993). Section 511(a) provides:
[t] he Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary to a
decision by the Secretary under a law that affects the provision of benefits
by the Secretary to veterans or the dependents or survivors of veterans.
Subject to subsection (b), the decision of the Secretary as to any such
question shall be final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by any
other official or by any court, whether by an action in the nature of man-
damus or otherwise.
Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5307(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Section 5307 provides:
(a) All or any part of the compensation, pension, or emergency officers'
retirement pay payable on account of any veteran may-
(2) if the veteran is not living with the veteran's spouse, or if the vet-
eran's children are not in the custody of the veteran, be apportioned as
may be prescribed by the Secretary.
Id.
206. See 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (Supp. V 1993). Section 5301 provides:
(a) Payments of benefits due or to become due under any law adminis-
tered by the Secretary shall not be assignable except to the extent specifi-
cally authorized by law, and such payments made to, or on account of, a
beneficiary shall be exempt from taxation, shall be exempt from the
claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure
by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after
receipt by the beneficiary.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1988). Section 659 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including section 407 of this
title), effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to which is based
upon remuneration for employment) due from, or payable by, the
United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivi-
sion, or instrumentality thereof) to any individual, including members of
the armed services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same ex-
tent as if the United States or the District of Columbia were a private
person, to legal process brought for the enforcement, against such indi-
vidual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony
payments.
Id.
207. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 636 (1986) (noting that "neither the Veter-
ans' Benefits provisions of Title 38 nor the garnishment provisions of the Child
Support Enforcement Act of Title 42 indicate unequivocally that a veteran's disa-
bility benefits are provided solely for that veteran's support").
208. Id. at 640-44 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judgment).
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generally. This alliance in result is not evidence that Justice Scalia
was swept up in a textualist tide that landed him on the same beach
with liberals. In the first instance, there is no evidence in the con-
viction that parents, particularly fathers, should pay child support is
a uniquely liberal or conservative view. Americans of all stripes and
philosophies likely see this as a father's moral and legal obligation.
Therefore, a conservative Justice's agreement that a veteran must
use his benefits to support his children is rather unsurprising when
the law can fairly be construed to require this under some circum-
stances.209 The fact that Justice Scalia has nine children may have
also been a key factor in shaping his position on this issue.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Rose could have partly legiti-
mized his textualist philosophy if its application resulted in social
engineering of the type Justice Marshall's construction facili-
tated.2 10 However, Justice Scalia took pains to point out that his
conclusion stemmed from being presented with and answering the
limited question of whether a state court may base an award of
child support on veteran's benefits.211 Although Justice Scalia
agreed with Justice Marshall's conclusion, application of textualism
may arguably command a different result.
Although Justice Scalia agreed that a state court may act as the
Tennessee court did in Rose, he suggested that had the Administra-
tor of Veterans' Affairs exercised his authority to apportion the vet-
eran's benefits, a state court would have been disempowered to
make a conflicting award.212 Further, another section of the statute
specifically prohibits the attachment, levy or seizure of veterans'
benefits, thereby explicitly limiting State courts' powers to issue or-
ders of support.213 Despite this express limitation (plain text), Jus-
tice Scalia concluded that a state court may award support and
209. Id. at 626-29. The plain language of § 5307(a) (2) and implementing
regulations clearly contemplates the use of benefits for child support in appropri-
ate cases. For a further discussion of 38 U.S.C. § 5307 (a) (2), see supra note 205.
210. Rose, 481 U.S. at 626-28. Justice Marshall's decision was apparently partly
driven by convictions that state courts should have wide latitude in the family law
area even if arguably preempted, provided they did not frustrate federal law. Id.
211. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judgment) (noting that he
could not join much of court's analysis because in his view, it erroneously sug-
gested that certain state actions not before court in this case were permissible be-
cause they did not frustrate purposes of federal provisions).
212. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judgment) (noting that it
would be "extraordinary to hold that a federal officer's authorized allocation of
federally granted funds between two claimants could be overridden by a state
official").
213. Id. at 642-43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and judgment) (citing 38
U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1988)).
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enforce it through civil contempt. As an interpretive matter, it
seems odd to conclude that a state court cannot touch a veteran's
benefits as an original matter by legal or equitable process, yet con-
clude that the same court may indirectly do the prohibited act by
enforcing an award of the same benefits by civil contempt proceed-
ings. Justice Scalia's opinion is therefore not an example of consis-
tent application of textualist rules leading to liberal results.
2. Civil Rights (Pregnancy Discrimination)
It has been suggested that textualism was deployed in California
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,214 resulting in the liberal
conclusion that a state law protecting the jobs of employees out on
pregnancy leave was not preempted by provisions of Title VII which
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. However, a close analy-
sis shows that textualism was only partially and awkwardly deployed
and Justice Scalia did not fully join the liberals. Writing for the
Court, Justice Marshall concluded that a state law providing special
job protections during pregnancy leave was consistent with the pur-
poses of Title VII generally (to achieve equality and remove barri-
ers) and the specific requirements of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA).215 Justice Marshall found that it was not impossible for
employers to comply with the state law guaranteeing leave and rein-
statement to only female employees and the federal laws prohibit-
ing preferential treatment on the basis of sex.2 16
Justice Scalia took the position that the Court's broad interpre-
tation that Title VII and the PDA permit such protection was unwar-
ranted.21 7 He argued that the Court's analysis should have been
limited to interpreting the preemptive effect of section 708 of the
PDA which preempts laws that "require or permit the doing of any
Act which would be an unlawful employment practice."2 18 Inter-
preting the California statute, Justice Scalia determined that the
state law did not "remotely purport to require or permit any refusal
to accord federally mandated equal treatment to others similarly
situated."219 This conclusion happens to be more a manipulation
214. 479 U.S. 272 (1986).
215. Id. at 274 (referring to Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1988)).
216. See id. at 280 (noting that Title VII does not preempt state law that guar-
antees pregnant women certain number of pregnancy disability leave days because
this is neither unlawful under Title VII nor inconsistent with its purpose).
217. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988)).
219. Id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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of textualist focus than proper application of textualist theory. In-
stead of interpreting the anti-discrimination mandates of Title VII,
which incidentally is the heart of the case, Justice Scalia limited his
focus to preemption provisions. Such strategic focus allowed him
to avoid an inevitably contrary conclusion mandated by textualism.
Specifically, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin."220 The PDA amend-
ing Title VII defines sex discrimination as including discrimination:
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions; and women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of fringe benefits under fringe benefit pro-
grams, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-
2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise. 221
California Federal, the employer in this case, had a disability policy
that did not guarantee any employee a job upon return from disa-
bility related leave. 222
The plain language of Title VII prohibits sex discrimination.
This means either sex, male or female. Justice Scalia should have
had no problem with this construction because he has been very
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id.
221. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (emphasis added).
222. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 278. The employer's policy allowed all employees
with three months of service to take unpaid leave for a variety of reasons, including
disability and pregnancy. Id. However, the employer reserved the right to termi-
nate any employee whose job was filled and no similar position was open at the
time of return. Id. The California code made it unlawful for an employer to deny
a woman pregnancy-related leave and guaranteed such leave for up to four
months. Id. at 275-76. Men did not have similar guarantees for disability leave by
the statute or under the employer's policy, and employers did not violate the stat-
ute by failing to grant men the same protection as provided for women. Id. at 275-
76.
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forceful in pointing out that the "race" provision in Title VII means
black or white. 22 3 Further, the plain language of the PDA pros-
cribes adverse treatment of women because of pregnancy and si-
multaneously requires equal treatment for pregnancy disability. In
this case, the employer did not guarantee any employee ajob upon
return from disability leave. Hence, "same treatment" under the
PDA would be nullified by a state law which required that the em-
ployer guarantee a job to employees of a particular gender re-
turning from pregnancy (disability) leave. Effectuating the statute's
plain meaning would therefore require preemption because it con-
travenes federal requirements.
It is precisely this plain-text problem that caused the majority
to resort to legislative history in support of their conclusions. Turn-
ing to the PDA's legislative history and goals, Justice Marshall wrote:
"[i] t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers.' "224 The conclusion that
textualism was deployed is further belied by Justice Marshall's cita-
tion to Steelworkers v. Weber,225 as support for his "look to the spirit"
construction. The bitter irony and reality is that Weberwas also cited
by Justice Brennan as authoritative support for his decision in John-
son v. Transportation Agency, where Justice Scalia wrote a passionate
dissent.226 In Johnson, Justice Brennan wrote that a promotion
scheme that gave preference to female employees was not forbid-
den by Title VII.2 2 7 In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the plain
language of Title VII (the same provision at issue in California Fed-
eral) commanded a different result. Specifically, Justice Scalia con-
tended that the Court was interpreting the statute to compel rather
than prohibit discrimination. 228 In view of the language of Title VII
and the PDA, and considering the interpretive commands of textu-
alism, including prior interpretations by Justice Scalia, the Califor-
nia Federal case clearly does not evidence deployment of textualism.
The extent to which Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment is
liberal is also limited by the narrow focus of his analysis.
223. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (writing that "[a] statute designed to establish a color-blind and gen-
der-blind workplace has thus been converted into a powerful engine of fascism and
sexism, not merely permitting intentional race and sex-based discrimination, but
often making it through operation of the legal system, practically compelled").
224. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 284 (citations omitted).
225. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
226. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 641-42.
228. Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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3. Immigration Law
Two immigration decisions are cited as further examples of
Justice Scalia's deployment of textualism, resulting in endorsement
of liberal interpretations.229 In Kungys v. United States,230 Justice
Scalia wrote a plurality opinion which interpreted the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA)2 31 as requiring a stringent Agency show-
ing in denaturalization proceedings to establish concealment or
misrepresentation of a material fact.232 But Justice Scalia also re-
fused to impose a materiality requirement under the Act for false
testimony designed to obtain immigration or naturalization bene-
fits.2 33 The first conclusion is a liberal one; the second is not. In
any event, his interpretation did not essentially involve the deploy-
ment of textualism to interpret the word "material." Rather, his
liberal conclusion stemmed from offering an interpretation that
comports with customary meaning and understanding for both lib-
eral and conservative readers. Obviously, the touchstone of textual-
ism is not determination of evidentiary or proof requirements.
Kungys was not a case about what materiality means, but rather what
materiality requires.
The second immigration case is INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.234 Here
the Court ruled that applicants for asylum need only show a "well-
founded" reason to fear persecution rather than a "clear
probability" that they would be persecuted.2 35 Justice Scalia's con-
clusion that "well-founded fear" is something less than "clear
probability" is liberal. And textualism was deployed to preclude
consideration of legislative history because Justice Scalia concluded
that the statute's language is "plain." However, even with the con-
cession that this case represents deployment of textualism to en-
229. Two additional decisions usually cited for this proposition are omitted
from the analysis because there is little, if anything, uniquely liberal or conservative
about their character. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988)
(interpreting Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 and implementing regula-
tions); United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987) (interpreting Federal Tort
Claims Act).
230. 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
231. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1994).
232. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772 (requiring that INS show by clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence that misrepresentation or concealment "had natural ten-
dency to influence the decisions" of INS).
233. Id. at 782. This conclusion makes any false testimony, no matter how
trivial, a basis for the INS to conclude that an applicant for benefits does not have
good moral character.
234. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
235. Id. at 449.
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dorse a liberal result, it is not necessarily inconsistent with
conservative judicial philosophy.
As noted earlier, conservative philosophy only denotes general
thinking on core issues and may accommodate liberal or even con-
tradictory views in particular cases. To say thatJustice Scalia agreed
with liberal thought in Cardoza-Fonseca is not to say that he is a lib-
eral on all immigration matters. And to say that Justice Scalia
deployed textualism in one immigration case is not to say he would
deploy it in another. Therefore, Cardoza-Fonseca is not a litmus test
for textualism or pure conservative thought. Fortunately, there are
opportunities to observe Justice Scalia at work in the immigration
area.
The Haitian refugee situation had drawn clear lines between
liberal and conservative camps. Although the call for stringent or
exclusionary application of immigration laws has at times been bi-
partisan,23 6 support for Haitian refugees typically come from liberal
quarters. The Bush Administration's policy of interdicting Haitians
at sea and returning them to Haiti typifies conservative attitudes on
this question. On the other side, liberals wanted Haitians picked
up in international waters properly screened for asylum. This di-
chotomy played itself out in the 1992 presidential campaign with
President Bush steering clear of the issue and then-Governor Clin-
ton pledging to give Haitian refugees due process. 23 7 The issue
had even been framed in terms of discriminatory opposition to
dark-skinned immigrants by conservative policy-makers. 238 Pitched
in such terms, immigration from Haiti pitted liberals against
conservatives.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)2 39 provides in sec-
tion 243(h) (1): "The Attorney General shall not deport or return
236. New immigrants may be seen by a cross section of the community in
which they land and stay as a threat. They represent for some, competition for
jobs and public resources, among other things. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Ac-
quiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic Agendas in
Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum Seekers, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 17-
18, 24 (1993).
237. See Christopher Marquis, Clinton Summary Repatriations to Haiti to End,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 13, 1992, at 24A. After being elected, President-elect Bill Clin-
ton reaffirmed his pledge by stating that: "I think we should have a process in
which these Haitians get a chance to make their case .... I think that.., sending
them back to Haiti under the circumstances which have prevailed for the last year
was an error." Id.
238. See Cheryl Little, United States Haitian Policy: A Histoy of Discrimination, 10
N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTs. 269 (1993); see alsoJohnson, supra note 236, at 26 (stating
that people of color from Haiti have been singled out or given special negative
treatment by United States armed forces).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1994).
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any alien .. to a country if the Attorney General determines that
such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion."24° On May 23, 1992, Presi-
dent Bush signed Executive Order 12807241 under which Haitians
were intercepted in international waters and forcibly returned to
Haiti without being screened to determine their refugee status. 24
2
This repatriation was contrary to immigration policy and represen-
tations made to the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General of the
United States.2 43
In support of its no-screen repatriation policy, the government
argued, among other things, that the above-quoted provision of the
INA does not apply to refugees picked up in international waters
and returned to their country. 244 To reach this conclusion, the gov-
emment pointed to the structure of the INA, other INA provisions
that purportedly contravene section 243 (h) (1), INA provisions that
limit coverage to aliens in the United States, and other immigration
protocols (schemes) and their legislative histories.245 The govern-
240. Id.
241. 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133-34 (1992).
242. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (2d Cir.), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2549 (1992).
243. See id. at 1356-57. The repatriation of Haitian refugees has a long history
in federal courts. Haitian and human rights advocates began a stream of litigation
in 1991 in response to the United States interdiction and repatriation program for
Haitians fleeing their country by sea. The flight of Haitians was traced directly to
the overthrow of their democratically elected president. The Haitian Refugee
Center located in Miami sued to enjoin the government's repatriation program
and won a preliminary injunction. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp.
1552 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991). Judge Atkins, who issued
the injunction, is generally regarded as liberal. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the injunction was dissolved. Haitian
Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991). Judge Hatchett, the dissent-
ingjudge on appeal, is black. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case but Judge
Atkins again granted injunctive relief in favor of the Refugee Center and this was
again appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F.
Supp. 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1122 (1992). The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the govern-
ment's actions were proper. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992). This decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court but writ of certiorari was denied. Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker,
953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992).
During the certiorari proceedings, the Solicitor General represented to the
Supreme Court that screened individuals would be brought to the United States to
pursue asylum claims. See McNay, 969 F.2d at 1356-57. Once certiorari was denied
in the Baker case, however, the government changed its position and began inter-
cepting and returning Haitians without screening for asylum eligibility. Id. at
1357.
244. See McNary, 969 F.2d at 1358.
245. Id. at 1358-60.
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ment did not rely on the statute's text.
Judge Pratt of the Second Circuit steered the government to
the provision's language, however, although sometimes he eagerly
confirmed textual mandates with legislative history.246 To interpret
the text, Judge Pratt turned to the statute's previous textual formu-
lation which provided that: " It] he Attorney General is authorized to
withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any
country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to perse-
cution on account of race, religion, or political opinion." 247 He in-
terpreted the textual amendments as mandatory-prohibitive on the
Attorney General by providing "shall not" thereby limiting the At-
torney General's powers of repatriation by prohibiting deportations
and "returns" and broadening alien coverage by excising "within
the United States," thereby protecting "any alien."2 48 In sum, the
plain text of the statute says that the government shall not deport or
return any alien. The statute also defines aliens as persons not citi-
zens or nationals of the United States thereby placing Haitians
squarely under the text's umbrella.2 49
Based on the textual changes, Congress specifically removed
the geographic limitation on aliens thereby broadening coverage to
aliens in any location. Extraterritorial waters would therefore fall
within the literal ambit of the statute. Congress also added "return"
after the word "deport," a legal term of art applied to individuals
(aliens) in the United States. 250 The INA does not define "return"
but the ordinary meaning of the word is generally well understood.
In any event, Judge Pratt turned to the dictionary to ascertain or
confirm the word's ordinary meaning, i.e., to put back in a former
position. 251 Judge Pratt also attributed ordinary meaning to the
President's use of the word "return" in his Executive Order which
required the return of vessels and passengers to their country of ori-
gin.2 52 Under Justice Scalia's textualist methodology, the analysis
246. Id. at 1359 (stating that Court's reading "gives full vitality to all portions
of § 243(h), as actually written by Congress").
247. Id. at 1357.
248. Id. at 1357-58.
249. Id. at 1358. The definition found at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) states: "The
term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (3) (1994).
250. See McNary, 969 F.2d at 1360-61 (stating that inclusion of word "return,"
in its ordinary meaning, indicates that returning aliens from international waters is
prohibited by the INA).
251. See id. at 1360.
252. Id. at 1361 (presuming that ordinary meaning is intended by President
as well as Congress).
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would stop here. The plain language would be given its ordinary
meaning. Unless insistence on the plain meaning would lead to
absurd results, Justice Scalia's textualism would not countenance
consideration of statutory structure or parallel regulatory
schemes.253
However, Judge Pratt went on to consider and reject the gov-
ernment's non-textual arguments on a variety of grounds. For ex-
ample, the government argued that section 243(h) (1) was placed in
the "deportation section" of the statute that applies to aliens in the
United States.2 54 He rejected this construction as elevating location
or structure over plain text, and in any event noted that prior to the
1980 amendment, this section dealt only with deportation which
logically explains the provision's location.2 55 In addition, the gov-
ernment argued that another section of the INA prohibited the ap-
plication of section 243(h) (1) in situations where the alien
committed certain nonpolitical crimes prior to arrival "in the
United States."256 This interpretation was rejected because it re-
quired using one section of the statute providing for a criminal ex-
ception to trump the specific language of section 243(h) (1) by
reading the "in the United States" requirement back into section
243(h) (1) after Congress purposefully took it out.257
Another interpretive guide the government used is the parallel
refugee provision found in the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention
which provides that: "[n]o contracting state shall expel or return
(refouler) a refugee"258 under conditions similar to those set out in
253. Judge Pratt does not appear to be a textualist but begins his analysis with
primary reliance on the text. Although he concluded that the language of
§ 243(h) (1) was plain, this was not conclusive. He expressed a willingness to "turn
to other canons of construction [but] only to determine whether there is a 'clearly
expressed legislative intention' contrary to that language, which would require us
to question the virtually conclusive presumption that congress meant what it said."
Id. at 1358. Judge Pratt noted, however, thatJustice Scalia sees statutory construc-
tion differently. Id. (citing Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)).
254. Id. at 1359.
255. Id. at 1359-60.
256. See id. at 1359.
257. Id. (indicating that not only does government's interpretation contra-
vene congressional intent, but also is inconsistent with common sense).
258. See id. at 1361. The 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees provides that: "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. (incorporated by United Nations Protocol Relating to Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1978 [1968], art. 31, 19 U.S.T. 1223, T.IA.S. 6577). Section 2 of
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section 243(h) (1). It was argued that the 1980 amendment to sec-
tion 243(h) (1) simply brought it in conformity with Article 33 of
the Convention which uses "return" only with respect to refugees
within a country's territorial borders.2 59 In support, the govern-
ment relied on a dictionary definition of "refouler" as opposed to
"return," legislative history in the form of a statement by one coun-
try's representative at the final reading of the draft Convention and
the President's interpretation.2 60
This interpretation was rejected with plain text and coherence
of structure analysis. Judge Pratt noted that construction principles
used for statutes are also applicable to treaties, and the word "re-
turn" has the same ordinary meaning in either text.2 6 1 Further, he
argued that the definition of refugee under the protocol was the
same as the INA's because it covered "any person outside [his or
her] country of nationality."2 62 In instances when the treaty parties
wanted refugees to be defined in territorial terms, they so provided
in the articles.263 With respect to the government's dictionary defi-
nition of "refouler," to wit, "expel aliens," the judge proffered other
definitions in dictionaries, including the government's, which de-
fined the term as - "to repel or drive back."26 In any event, the
judge recognized the incoherence caused by the government's defi-
nition that transformed the text from "expel or return" to "expel or
expel." 265 Finally, the negotiations' history of the Refugee Conven-
tion and the President's interpretation were rejected as weak guides
of construction, partisan and self serving.2 66
President Bush's cousin, John M. Walker, Jr., dissented.267 He
concluded that the Haitian refugee representatives were barred
Article 33 also has a "serious crime" provision similar to the one found in 243(h)
of the INA. Id. at art. 33, § 2.
259. See McNaty, 969 F.2d at 1361.
260. See id. at 1361-65.
261. Id. at 1361-62 (citing with approval Justice Scalia's concurrence in
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
262. Id. at 1362.
263. See id.
264. Id. at 1363.
265. Id. (noting that word "expel" was necessary to clarify that Article applied
to specific manner of "return" as well as other manners).
266. Id. at 1365-67. With respect to the government's reliance on legislative
history to undermine the clear language of the convention,Judge Pratt responded
with a quote from Justice Scalia's concurrence in United States v. Thompson, 504
U.S. 505 (1992) which characterized such reliance as "that last hope of lost inter-
pretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction." Id. at 1365
(citing Thompson, 504 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
267. See id. at 1369 (Walker, J., dissenting).
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from litigating these issues for a variety of procedural reasons, and
on the merits, concluded that section 243(h) (1) does not apply to
aliens in extraterritorial waters. 268 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari,269 and several justices had previously tipped their hands on
this issue when another writ for certiorari was denied in early
1992.270 As Justice Blackmun observed:
[t]he world has followed with great concern the fate of
thousands of individuals who fled Haiti in the wake of that
country's September 1991 military coup. As the complex
procedural history of this case reveals, the legal issues sur-
rounding the rights of Haitians interdicted on the high
seas by the United States Coast Guard have deeply divided
the four federal Judges who have considered their
claims. 271
In June of 1993, the Supreme Court decided the Haitian asy-
lum seekers' fate.2 72 Justice Scalia silently joined the majority opin-
ion which held that neither section 243(h) nor Article 33 applied
extraterritorially.273 The Court found that the President's powers
were not limited by the statute or protocol and the legal meaning of
the word "return" was narrower than the common meaning. 274 Ex-
tensive reliance was placed on legislative and negotiations' history
to support the Court's conclusions.2 75
In what read like a Scalia lecture on statutory construction, Jus-
tice Blackmun in a passionate dissent, outlined the flaws of the ma-
jority's interpretation. 276 Noting that the texts of section 243(h)
and Article 33 were unambiguous, he argued that the Court should
have ended its inquiry with the statute and treaty terms and given
the words their ordinary meaning.2 77 He found that no territorial
restriction was placed in either provision and no contextual basis
existed for reading one into the same.2 78 Justice Blackmun ob-
served that the Court had to ascribe a legal meaning to the text
268. Id. at 1370, 1373 (Walker, J., dissenting).
269. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993).
270. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992). For a discussion
of this case, see supra note 243 and accompanying text.
271. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
272. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
273. Id. at 2550, 2552.
274. Id. at 2559-67.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 2567-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 2568-70, 2573-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
278. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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different from the ordinary meaning to reach its conclusion that
"the word 'return' does not mean return;" that "the opposite of
'within the United States' is not outside the United States;" and that
"the official charged with controlling immigration has no role in
enforcing an order to control immigration."279
Because of the Court's heavy reliance on legislative and negoti-
ations' history, Justice Blackmun responded that such data cannot
surmount plain text, except in special cases "where the terms of the
document are obscure or lead to 'manifestly absurd or unreasona-
ble' results."2 8 0 In any event, the historical textual evolution of sec-
tion 243(h) (part of its legislative history) negates the Court's
interpretation because in amending the Act in 1980, Congress "(1)
deleted the words 'within the United States;' (2) barred the Gov-
ernment from 'return [ing],' as well as 'deport[ing],' alien refugees;
and (3) made the prohibition against return mandatory, thereby
eliminating the discretion of the Attorney General over such
decisions."2 11
Quoting from Cardoza-Fonseca, Justice Blackmun added that
"[flew principles of statutory construction are more compelling
than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to
enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of
other language."2 2 Justice Blackmun further added that " [t]o read
into § 243(h)'s mandate a territorial restriction is to restore the
very language that Congress removed."28 3 With respect to the ma-
jority's reliance on the treaty's negotiations history, Justice Black-
mun noted that a statement by the Netherlands delegate cannot
override text, particularly when such statement was not adopted or
agreed to, and in view of previous recognition by the United States
government that the convention applied extraterritorially.28 4
Finally, he noted that "[i]f any canon of construction should be
applied in this case, it is the well-settled rule that 'an act of Con-
gress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains.' "285 Hence, while Kungys and
279. Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
280. See id. at 2571 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (citing Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 I.L.M. 679,
692 (1969)).
281. Id. at 2574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 442-43 (1987).
283. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2570-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
285. See id. at 2577 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting Murray v. The Charm-
ing Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 117-18, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804)).
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Cardoza-Fonseca may in many respects be regarded as liberal deci-
sions, they are scant evidence that theoretical rules control Justice
Scalia's interpretations.
E. Competing Impulses
The conclusion that a particular Justice reaches when constru-
ing a particular statute is more likely the product of many complex
forces that transcend liberal or conservative labels. Clear instances
of Justices rendering decisions outside their labels suggest that insti-
tutional integrity and intellectual capacity play key roles alongside
all those factors (race, religion, financial status, socialization) that
go into making people conservative or liberal. The fact that people
may change over time is also an important consideration. A more
reasoned explanation of "aberrational" decisions seems to be that
when faced with a statute, a Justice is impacted by a variety of im-
pulses, some more dominant than others. Although dominant im-
pulses may be the driver, such impulses are tempered and steered
by judicial integrity and intellect that force a consideration of mi-
nor or lesser impulses. For any number of reasons, most of which
are speculative, lesser impulses sometimes prevail.
A prime example of competing impulses at work on a liberal
Justice can be seen in Emporium Capwell v. Western Community Organi-
zation.2 86 Here, the Court was called upon to interpret section 9(a)
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).287 Section 9 (a) of the
NLRA provides:
[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of em-
ployees shall have the right at any time to present griev-
ances to their employer and to have such grievances
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining repre-
sentative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect:
286. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
287. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
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Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such ad-
justment.288
Interpretation of section 9 (a) was triggered by a group of black
employees who contended that their employer was discriminating
against them and that the union and contractual procedures for
grievance adjustment were ineffective. 28 9 Previously, the president
of the employees' company had refused to meet with them to dis-
cuss their grievances.2 90 The employees then picketed the em-
ployer and were ultimately discharged.2 91 As stated by the Court,
the issue was "whether, in light of the national policy against racial
discrimination in employment, the National Labor Relations Act
protects concerted activity by a group of minority employees to
bargain with their employer over issues of employment
discrimination."292
The fact that Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the
Court suggests an affirmative answer, particularly because the
union had determined that the company was engaging in racial dis-
crimination, and so charged the company. Further, it is possible
for both the employer and union to engage in racial discrimination
thereby necessitating statutory protection for "self help" in the form
of economic protest by discrimination victims. All preconceived
notions stemming from associating these particular conclusions
with Justice Marshall become skewed when you find that Justice
Rehnquist joined in the opinion. It is unlikely that this discovery
would result in a conclusion that Justice Marshall is a conservative
or Justice Rehnquist is a liberal. A less troubling possibility is that
Justice Marshall engaged in liberal construction that Justice Rehn-
quist agreed with, or wrote a conservative (aberrational) decision,
thereby obtaining Justice Rehnquist's support. However, deeper
analysis suggests other possibilities more in tune with an "impulses"
formulation.
Specifically, the plain language of section 9(a) provides that
the union is the exclusive representative of the affected black em-
ployees.293 This language precludes direct employee to employer
grievance adjustment. The language, however, grants employees
288. Id.
289. See Emporium Capwell 420 U.S. at 50.
290. Id. at 55.
291. Id. at 56.
292. Id. at 52.
293. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
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the right of direct contact provided such contact is consistent with
the terms of the collective bargaining contract. In this case, it was
established that the employees' attempts to deal directly with the
company president contravened the contract which required reso-
lution through an Adjustment Board, and if necessary, arbitra-
tion.294 As a black liberal Justice committed to civil rights and
routine user of legislative history to protect individual rights, Justice
Marshall could have easily found legislative support evidencing an
intent to protect black employees under the circumstances. And he
could have vigorously advocated this construction, even if he had to
do so in dissent. However, he did not. Instead, Justice Marshall
wrote that the employees' actions were unprotected under the
NLRA.295
At least two primary impulses were at work on Justice Marshall
in Emporium Capwell. Upon reviewing Justice Marshall's back-
ground or judicial philosophy, it is reasonable to conclude that the
civil rights/abhorrence of racial discrimination impulses are strong.
But lesser and very important impulses that favor preserving the
integrity and strength of unions were also hard at work. Competing
or contradictory impulses do not always present "all or nothing"
options. And, the level of accommodation or compromise may de-
pend on the Justice's integrity, institutional respect for the
decisonmaking process and personal intellect. In this case, the
union impulses overrode the antidiscrimination impulses. Justice
Marshall concluded that the principle of majority rule evidenced by
section 9(a) controls, notwithstanding its potential to sacrifice the
rights of minorities.2 96 This principle secured a united front for the
union and protects fragmentation and competing claims by em-
ployees. The civil rights impulses were appeased with the conclu-
sion that the exclusive representative status came with built-in
minority protection in the form of democracy and good faith obli-
gation on the part of the union.297
In retrospect then, one may say that the decision is not truly
aberrational because, on a general level, it is truly a liberal decision.
That is, it is a pro-union decision by a Justice faced with two liberal
choices. But to dissect this decision on pro minority versus pro
union grounds is a distinction without a difference. Such an analy-
294. See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 53-55. The union had elected to use
the grievance arbitration machinery of the contract while the dissatisfied employ-
ees wanted to picket. Id.
295. Id. at 70.
296. Id. at 62.
297. Id. at 64.
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sis has elements of avoidance because it fails to account for Justice
Rehnquist's support or the dissatisfaction of minorities left at the
mercy of unions, which sometimes hold unattractive views on racial
discrimination.
Looking at the interpretive process as cyclical, however, brings
more coherence to it. It is doubtful that reformation of the Court
appointments process or theories of construction will bring integ-
rity and objectivity to statutory construction. While this broader
model does not directly exert pressure on the Justice to avoid ma-
nipulation, it contains elements of built-in deterrence. The 1964
Civil Rights Act2 98 offers a good example of how endemic cyclical
forces may deter manipulation, albeit in a delayed fashion.
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may not have been a
welcome development for employers. Political forces had been set
in motion and Congress responded with equal employment legisla-
tion which the President signed. Those who regarded themselves
as losers in the legislative process were now free to mitigate the loss
by persuading courts that the statute should be interpreted in a way
that favors them. Even if the losers are subjected to decisions they
regard as wrong, consolation lies in the prospect for "civilized re-
venge" through developments such as congressional override, shift
in the balance of power on the Court or the election of a new presi-
dent. Even a favorable decision on another subject may operate as
a therapeutic consolation prize. These multiple possibilities for
change provide the basis for hope and confidence in the long-term
potential of the Court to render "correct" interpretations. When
Justices breach this cycle by permitting ideology instead of legiti-
mate sources to guide the interpretive task, the results are likely to
be harmful even for their ideological brethrens.
For example, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, the
Court was offered competing interpretations by employers and em-
ployees. Initially, the Court sided with plaintiffs and rendered what
is generally regarded as broad (liberal) interpretations with liberal
results.2 9 Such liberal results are typically regarded as the product
of a liberal Court. Employers therefore remained losers to the ex-
tent that they regarded the Court's construction as inimical to busi-
298. 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)).
299. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (inter-
preting Civil Rights Act as extending to charges upon which the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission has not made finding); Griggs v.. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) (stating that Congress directed thrust of Title VII to conse-
quences of employer conduct thereby prohibiting practices fair in form but dis-
criminatory in application).
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ness interests. Justices favoring such pro-plaintiff rulings had no
doubt that their interpretations were correct whether supported by
the statute's text, legislative history or general legislative goals.
But employers would have their day. When sufficient support
was marshalled, conservative Justices rendered narrow interpreta-
tions that placed employers in the winners' category.300 Such nar-
row construction was viewed as right, regardless of the lack of
evidence that Congress desired such a result. Because such narrow
interpretations contravened Congress' design and intent, Congress
overruled the Court thereby returning plaintiffs to the winners' cir-
cle.30 ' But the cycle does not end. In the 1980s, the composition of
the Court changed and conservatives became the majority. Employ-
ers began moving back into the winners' circle as conservative Jus-
tices interpreted the statute more narrowly than they had in the
past.3 02 This flexing of conservative muscle showed clear indiffer-
ence to statutory text and rejection of obvious congressional prefer-
ence for broader interpretations.303 No doubt the conservative
Justices thought their interpretations were correct.30 4
Again, Congress responded to preserve employee protections
afforded by the statute.305 However, in this round, Congress did
more. It not only restored the protections the Court eroded, but
expanded the statute's remedial potential.30 6 Therein lies a poten-
300. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (finding that
employer's disability plan that excluded pregnancy from coverage did not violate
Tide VII); United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (finding that em-
ployer's mandatory retirement plan that forced employee McMann, to retire at age
60 did not violate Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 42 U.S.C. § 621
(1988)).
301. Gilbert was overruled by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-(k) (1988). United Airlines v. McMann was overruled by amendments to
the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
302. See, e.g., Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754
(1989) (denying plaintiff's recovery of attorney's fees from losing intervenors ex-
cept in limited circumstances); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (increasing plaintiffs' burden in disparate impact cases); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989) (making consent decrees concerning employment decisions
open to challenges); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (narrow-
ing statute of limitations period for challenging discriminatory seniority policies).
303. See, e.g., Lorance, 490 U.S. at 900. In Lorance, the Court could not point to
any legislative material to support its construction and instead relied on another
statute as its interpretive guide. Id. at 909-12.
304. The Court stated that its interpretation was necessary to protect employ-
ers from stale claims and disruptive influences. Id. at 911-12.
305. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991),
reversed many of the Court's interpretations.
306. Id. § 102 (providing for compensatory and punitive damages, and jury
trials); § 117 (expanding coverage to Congress); § 321 (expanding coverage to
previously exempt state employees); § 101 (expanding coverage to American em-
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tial inherent constraint on judicial manipulation and activism.
That is, the Court's refusal to be guided by a coherent legislative
mandate may lead to a congressional response which surpasses the
existing wrong that was sought to be corrected. This experience
should affect value judgments in future interpretive endeavors be-
cause Justices face the prospect of causing harm to the parties (con-
stituents) that they seek to protect. Because of the Court's activism,
employers now have more regulatory concerns than during the pe-
riod preceding the Court's favorable decisions. This seems to be a
heavy price for a fleeting victory achieved through promotion of
personal agendas.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia does not subscribe to textualism as a theory of
construction. Instead, his decisions suggest that fidelity to textual-
ism stems from its theoretic focus on neutral principles which is
more appealing than the competing partisan statements found in
legislative histories. Justice Scalia's subscription to textualism ends
with his adoption of its facially neutral premise. For this reason, it
is ineffective to analyze his statutory construction decisions using a
textualist model. Moreover, the minority rights cases demonstrate
that, at least in this area, Justice Scalia is not a textualist at all.
In the field of statutory interpretation, congressional players
are the experts and creators of the text. The evolutionary process
and experience of the text may in some cases be as important as the
text itself. For controversial or social policy legislation, considera-
tion of the statutes purposes and goals may be indispensable. That
one should consult, at the appropriate times, these probative guides
seems fundamental. In this regard, there are two issues, one of con-
sidering extratextual information, the other of relying on it.
It seems pragmatic, regardless of one's intellectual capacity or
confidence that, where appropriate, consideration of such materi-
als should be given, particularly because separation of powers prin-
ciples can be held inviolate while legislative history and other
contextualizing data is being considered. Use is another matter.
Justice Scalia's interpretations can be more informed, if that is his
goal, if he knows what the members of Congress said, in addition to
common usage, dictionary definitions or use of similar provisions in
other schemes. Consideration of all sources still leaves room for
independent judgment and avoids treading on legislative territory
ployees abroad); § 113 (allowing plaintiffs to recover fees paid to experts for case
preparation); § 114 (allowing for recovery of interest from federal government).
[Vol. 40: p. 93
58
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss1/2
1995] THE ILLUSION AND ALLURE OF TEXTUALISM 151
if that is truly a concern. Principled guides go for naught, however,
if the judge is predisposed to advancing his personal views instead
of vigilandy seeking out that of legislators.
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